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Brazilian-German Trade and Finance: Complements and 
Caveats
Complements
Endowment: Natural 
resources
Brazil is abundantly endowed in natural resources and land, whereas Germany is poor in the 
first and relatively poor in the second. Therefore, Brazilian exports of natural resources are 
welcome in Germany, which depends on importing raw materials from abroad.
Endowment: Labor Germany is relatively abundant in skilled labor and less so in unskilled labor. Hence, Germany 
holds a comparative advantage in producing goods and services that require advanced labor. 
Meanwhile, populous Brazil is working to improve its education system. Thus Brazil and Ger-
many are not competitors with respect to products that either require significant skilled labor 
or rely upon unskilled labor.
Endowment: Capital and 
current account balances
In order to enlarge the Brazilian capital stock, large investments are necessary. Brazil’s savings 
are not large enough to finance domestic investment. Germany has a high income level, high 
saving rate and current account surplus. Germany’s savings (and current account surplus) are 
therefore available to finance Brazil’s investment (and current account deficit).
Caveats
Context of trade policy Brazilian and German trade policies are firmly rooted in differences between the countries’ 
long-standing institutional structures and mind-sets. Brazil’s trade policy places a high pre-
mium on developing national industries and promoting the interests of developing countries. 
Germany’s economic policy is traditionally export-oriented and strongly intertwined with its 
European neighbors, to the degree that there is no independent German trade policy, only 
German interests that contribute to the formulation of the EU’s trade policy. These separate 
approaches can lead to differing trade strategies.
Agricultural products Brazil holds a comparative advantage in many agricultural products, which implies a 
disadvantage for German producers. German farmers, in turn, are being protected through 
restrictions and subsidies of the EU’s common agricultural policy. These measures are an object 
of consistent dispute.
Export-oriented 
job creation
Both countries have a strong interest in obtaining and maintaining high levels of employment. 
Increasing exports are a key instrument to satisfy this goal, especially for Germany. As a result, 
both countries pursue high exports and, consequently, current account surpluses. As all coun-
tries cannot simultaneously have current account surpluses, Germany’s surplus might sooner or 
later become an object of dispute.
Desired outcomes Although Brazil and Germany share the common aim to increase employment by foreign 
trade activities, they differ with respect to deeper desired outcomes of trade. In Brazil, fighting 
poverty, increasing the material prosperity of the population and importing technological 
knowledge are of greater importance than in Germany. In Germany, economic growth and full 
employment are the primary goals of trade.
Terms of trade and 
wealth
If the terms of trade of one country rise, that country receives a larger quantity of imported 
goods for a given bundle of exported goods. Therefore, an increase in the terms of trade of an 
economy has a positive impact on the wealth of the country. However, given the contrasting 
export portfolios, an improvement in Brazilian terms of trade would imply a reduction to 
German terms of trade (and vice versa). This represents an irresolvable trade-off.
Exchange rate policy The real depreciation of the domestic currency has a positive impact on the volume of a 
country’s exports. If, for example, Brazil tries to increase its exports by devaluing its currency, 
the result is a relative appreciation of Germany’s currency, which has a negative impact on 
German exports. As a result, there is another irresolvable trade-off if both countries try to incre-
ase exports by devaluing their currencies. However, as a member of the eurozone, Germany has 
limited influence on the exchange rate.
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Introduction
On	the	surface,	 it	would	seem	that	Brazil	and	Germany	present	many	opportunities	for	fruitful	
bilateral	 trade	 and	 investment.	 In	 terms	 of	 comparative	 advantages,	 the	 Brazilian	 export	
portfolio	 tacks	heavily	towards	precisely	the	raw	materials	German	manufacturers	require—and	
lack	 domestically.	 Conversely,	 German	 producers	 specializing	 in	 high-end	 technological	 and	
knowledge-based	goods	could	find	an	expanding	consumer	base	both	in	the	burgeoning	Brazilian	
middle	class	and	in	business-to-business	trade	with	Brazilian	partners.	In	terms	of	 investment,	
Brazil	would	appear	to	be	a	prime	destination	for	surplus	German	savings.	For	example,	Brazil	
faces	an	infrastructure	deficit	while	German	firms	have	achieved	particular	sophistication	in	this	
field.	For	German	firms,	investment	in	this	sector	in	Brazil	can	offer	returns	currently	unavailable	
in	continental	Europe.
To	 an	 extent,	 the	 statistics	 reflect	 the	 growing	 opportunities	 between	 the	 two.	 As	 this	 study	
demonstrates,	both	bilateral	trade	and	investment	have	increased	in	recent	years.	Nevertheless,	
the	 relationship	 has	 yet	 to	 reach	 its	 full	 potential.	 Politics	 and	 policies	 have	 curtailed	 trade	
expansion.	Brazil’s	membership	 in	 the	Mercosul	 trade	bloc	and	Germany’s	membership	 in	 the	
European	Union	have	hampered	the	pair’s	ability	to	forward	a	bilateral	trade	agreement,	as	each	
bloc	maintains	certain	defensive	positions	 that	 limit	 the	other	 from	exercising	 its	 comparative	
advantages.	 Capital	 flows	 between	 the	 two	 countries—especially	 long-term	 foreign	 direct	
investments—remain	underwhelming.	
This	paper,	jointly	authored	by	economists	and	political	scientists	from	the	Bertelsmann	Stiftung	
of	Germany	and	the	Fundação	Getúlio	Vargas	of	Brazil,	reviews	economic	relations	between	the	
two	 countries	 with	 a	 particular	 focus	 on	 highlighting	 the	 opportunities	 while	 addressing	 the	
bottlenecks	that	slow	bilateral	trade	and	investment.	The	text	is	organized	as	follows:
•	 	Chapter	I,	authored	primarily	by	specialists	from	the	Bertelsmann	Stiftung,	reviews	the	state	
of	Brazilian-German	trade.	The	chapter	reviews	each	country’s	drivers	of	trade	as	well	as	each	
country’s	trade	policies.	It	continues	to	analyze	the	nature	of	the	bilateral	trade	itself,	as	well	as	
policy	issues	that	prevent	further	trade.	The	chapter	then	reviews	progress	on	a	Mercosul-EU	
free	trade	agreement,	and	concludes	by	considering	21st	century	trade	opportunities.
•	 	Chapter	II,	authored	primarily	by	specialists	from	the	Getúlio	Vargas	Foundation,	considers	
investment,	 comparing	German	 and	 Brazilian	 capital	 flows	 against	what	 traditional	 theory	
predicts.	The	chapter	distinguishes	between	more	transient	portfolio	investment	and	longer-
term	foreign	direct	investment.	It	also	reviews	how	a	lack	of	harmonization	in	macroeconomic	
policy	can	lead	to	distortions	in	financial	flows.
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•	 	Chapter	III	attempts	to	draw	tangible	and	actionable	recommendations	based	on	the	first	two	
chapters.	This	 chapter	 accepts	 that	Germany	and	Brazil	may	pursue	differing	policies,	 and	
are	constrained	by	their	respective	regional	blocs,	but	it	argues	that	common	ground	exists.	
Forthcoming	policy	can	be	geared	towards	this	common	ground.	
In	the	21st	century,	neither	emerging	markets	nor	developed	countries	alone	can	sustain	global	
growth.	Rather,	it	will	be	the	interaction	between	the	knowledge	of	advanced	economies	and	the	
dynamisms	of	emerging	economies	that	will	most	likely	motor	global	growth.	We	believe	Brazil	
and	Germany	can	be	at	the	forefront	of	this	interaction.	
This	 text	 represents	 the	 outcome	 of	 a	 year-long	 collaboration	 between	 Bertelsmann	 Stiftung	
and	 the	Fundação	Getúlio	Vargas.	Moving	 forward,	 both	 sides	 are	 dedicated	 to	 continuing	 the	
exploration	of	bilateral	ties	between	Brazil	and	Germany	and	to	helping	build	a	truly	21st	century	
relationship.	
Prior	to	addressing	the	future	of	the	relationship,	this	introduction	first	offers	a	perspective	on	the	
past	and	the	present.
Brazil and Germany: Two countries with strong historical ties
Bilateral	relations	between	Brazil	and	Germany	are	long-standing	and	comprehensive.	The	history	
of	German	immigration	to	Brazil	traces	back	to	the	16th	century.	This	immigration	increased	at	
the	beginning	of	the	19th	century;	from	1872	through	1939,	nearly	200,000	Germans	immigrated	
to	Brazil.	This	tide	reached	an	apex	between	1920	and	1929,	when	76,000	Germans	crossed	the	
Atlantic	 to	Brazil.	 In	 the	 1940s	 and	1950s,	 people	 of	German	 origin	 accounted	 for	 roughly	20	
percent	of	the	population	in	some	Brazilian	states,	such	as	Santa	Catarina	and	Rio	Grande	do	Sul	
(see	Gregory,	2013,	pp.	114–121).
These	strong	ties	resulted	in	an	intensive	bilateral	economic	partnership	starting	in	the	second	
half	of	the	1950s.	In	1954,	for	example,	the	German	steel	company	Mannesmann	began	operations	
in	Brazil.	In	1955,	Sofunge,	which	later	became	a	part	of	Mercedes-Benz,	did	the	same.	German	
automaker	Volkswagen	opened	a	plant	in	1959.	In	the	1970s,	German	commitment	reached	its	peak	
when	German	companies	from	heavy	industry,	chemical	industry,	machinery,	plant	engineering	
and	the	automobile	industry	invested	large	sums	of	money	in	Brazil	and	established	numerous	
plants.	During	the	1980s,	German	companies	and	investors	reduced	their	involvements	because	
of	the	economic	downturn	in	Brazil.	Nevertheless,	at	present	there	are	about	1,600	companies	in	
Brazil	with	German	capital,	and	German	chambers	of	commerce	in	Sao	Paulo,	Rio	de	Janeiro	and	
Porto	Alegre	(see	Lohbauer,	2013,	pp.	133–135	and	144–145).
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There	is	also	a	strong	trade	relationship	between	both	countries.	Brazil	is	by	far	the	most	important	
Latin	American	trading	partner	for	Germany,	while	Germany	is	at	present	the	fifth	or	sixth	most	
important	trading	partner	for	Brazil,	behind	China,	the	US,	Argentina,	the	Netherlands	and	Japan	
(see	Lohbauer	,2013,	p.	144).
Relations	between	Brazil	 and	Germany	are	not	 restricted	 to	 economic	 ties.	 For	more	 than	140	
years,	the	two	have	been	linked	by	active	bilateral	diplomatic	relations.	People	in	both	countries	
share	 important	 values,	 most	 notably	 for	 democracy	 and	 corresponding	 institutions.	 Bilateral	
cooperation	 has	 occurred	 on	 issues	 including	 education,	 culture	 (there	 are,	 for	 example,	 five	
Goethe-Instituts	 in	Brazil),	science	and	technology,	climate	change	and	environment,	 labor	and	
social	affairs,	energy	and	international	crisis	management.
These	extensive	connections	form	a	sound	base	of	mutual	trust,	respect	and	support	that	serves	
as	the	foundation	for	an	expansion	of	bilateral	economic	relations	to	the	benefit	of	both	countries.
Brazil and Germany: The largest economies of their respective 
regions
Brazil	is	the	core	economy	of	Latin	America,	and	Germany	plays	that	role	for	the	EU.	Measured	in	
terms	of	gross	domestic	product	(GDP),	Germany	has	a	20	percent	share	of	total	EU	GDP,	while	
Brazil’s	 share	 of	 Latin	American	 and	Caribbean	GDP	 is	 even	 larger,	 accounting	 for	 almost	 38	
percent	(see	Table	1).
The	importance	of	Brazil	and	Germany	to	their	respective	geographical	regions	is	also	reflected	
in	population	size.	Germany	accounts	for	roughly	16	percent	of	the	entire	EU	population,	while	
Brazilians	account	for	a	third	of	the	Latin	American	and	Caribbean	population	(see	Table	2).
Table 1: Estimated Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2013, expressed in current 
prices
Region/Country GDP absolute in US$ (Billions) Share of the relevant region in percent
European Union (EU) 17.267 100.0 
Germany 3.593 20.8 
Latin America and the Caribbean 5.774 100.0 
Brazil 2.190 37.9 
Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, October 2013.
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Hence	due	to	their	economic	strength,	Brazil	and	Germany	can	be	considered	anchor	economies	
for	Latin	America	and	the	European	Union.
Table 2: Population, expressed in millions
Region/Country Population mid-2013 Share of the relevant region in percent
European Union (EU) 506.0 100.0 
Germany 80.6 15.9 
Latin America and the Caribbean 606.0 100.0 
Brazil 195.5 32.3 
Source: World Population Reference Bureau: World Population Data Sheet 2013, p. 8–11.
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Chapter I: Trade
This	 chapter	 reviews	 the	drivers	 of	 trade	 for	Brazil	 and	Germany,	 as	well	 as	 the	opportunities	
inherent	in	the	pair’s	bilateral	trade	relationship.	Section 1	offers	a	brief	overview	of	Brazil	and	
Germany’s	 complementary	 relationship	 with	 room	 for	 growth,	 while	 Section 2	 considers	 the	
drivers	of	trade	for	both	countries.	Section 3	reviews	German	and	Brazilian	trade	policy,	which,	
in	turn,	influences	Section 4,	which	analyzes	actual	German-Brazilian	trade.	Section 5	considers	
the	complications	of	that	trade,	while	the	Section 6	reviews	progress	towards	a	Mercosul-EU	Free	
Trade	Agreement	(FTA).
1. A Complementary Relationship With Room for Growth
The	Brazilian-German	trade	relationship	is	mutually	beneficial	and	growing.	Burgeoning	commerce	
stems	from	compatible	export	portfolios	and	national	endowments.	German	demand	for	Brazilian	
raw	materials	is	matched	by	Brazilian	demand	for	high-quality	goods	manufactured	in	Germany.	
Germany	 offers	 Brazil	 diversification	 away	 from	 predominant	 partners	 such	 as	 China	 and	 the	
US,	as	well	as	access	to	capital	and	cutting-edge	technology.	Meanwhile,	Brazil	offers	Germany	a	
modicum	of	resource	security,	as	well	as	access	to	a	massive	and	rapidly	expanding	middle	class	
whose	members	are	potential	customers	for	German	industrial	goods.	
Unfortunately,	the	trade	relationship	is	not	dictated	by	economics	alone.	In	both	countries,	trade	
policy	is	partially	shaped	by	political	and	institutional	factors	that	may	make	the	path	to	improving	
the	relationship	more	complicated	than	simply	increasing	bilateral	investment.	
2. The Drivers of Trade
Drivers of Brazilian Foreign Trade 
Determining	Brazil’s	 factor	endowments	is	more	difficult	 than	in	its	region’s	 less	economically	
dynamic	countries,	such	as	Argentina	and	Chile,	because	of	Brazil’s	 large,	complex	portfolio	of	
imports	 and	 exports	 (Muriel	 and	 Terra,	 2009).	 Moreover,	 the	 country’s	 true	 abundances	 and	
deficiencies	have	most	 likely	been	obscured	or	at	 least	distorted	by	years	of	protectionist	 trade	
policy.
Despite	this	caveat,	certain	factor	trends	are	clear.	In	particular,	Brazil	enjoys	strong	endowments	
in	labor	and	especially	land	and	natural	resources.	With	a	population	of	more	than	200	million	
and	a	still-developing	school	system,	Brazil	maintains	factor	abundance	in	unskilled	labor.	This	
abundance	is	often	exploited	through	agricultural	labor	such	as	coffee	cultivation.	Brazil,	which	
is	the	fifth	largest	country	in	the	world	by	area	but	has	a	relatively	low	population	density,	clearly	
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has	an	abundance	of	land.	It	is	rich	in	natural	resources,	including	fertile	land,	minerals,	water	and	
forests.	Brazilian	trade	patterns	also	indicate	a	degree	of	capital.	Muriel	and	Terra	posit	that	this	
capital	could	reflect	interactions	with	even	less-developed	countries,	or	a	residual	distortion	from	
the	import	substitution	industrialization	(ISI)	period.
In	 Brazil,	 the	 volume	 and	 structure	 of	 exports	 is	 heavily	 influenced	 by	 an	 abundance	 of	 raw	
resources,	 high	 commodity	 prices	 and	 strong	 global	 growth	 levels.	 Brazil	 is	 rich	 in	 mineral	
resources	 such	 as	 iron	 ore	 and	 agricultural	 products	 such	 as	 soybeans	 that	 are	 vital	 for	 large	
emerging	markets,	specifically	those	pursuing	an	urbanization	strategy	such	as	China.	Emerging-
market	growth	and,	subsequently,	strong	commodity	prices	have	been	drivers	of	Brazilian	exports	
in	 the	21st	century.	Beyond	certain	niche	 industries	such	as	Embraer	aircraft,	Brazilian	export	
expansion	in	recent	years	has	been	pushed	by	global	demand	for	raw	materials.	
Brazilian	imports	are	typically	driven	by	the	need	to	supply	domestic	manufacturers	with	parts,	
as	well	as	the	need	to	satisfy	Brazilian	demand	for	manufactured	goods	beyond	the	capacities	of	
domestic	firms.	Strong	growth	in	formal	employment	and	real	wages,	combined	with	initiatives	
such	 as	 the	 conditional	 cash	 transfer	 program	 Bolsa	 Familia,	 have	 lifted	 tens	 of	 millions	 of	
Brazilians	from	poverty	and	have	created	a	growing	lower-middle	and	middle	class	of	consumers	
who	can	now	afford	imported	manufactured	goods.	The	recent	economic	growth	has	also	fostered	
an	upper	class	keen	on	high-end	European	imports.	
Brazil’s	endowment	weakness	appears	to	lie	in	its	relative	lack	of	skilled	labor,	such	as	engineers.	
Here	it	 is	important	to	draw	regional	distinctions,	as	Brazil’s	labor	endowment	is	differentiated	
across	the	country.	Urban	centers	such	as	São	Paulo	and	Rio	de	Janeiro	may	have	more	access	to	
skilled	labor.	Other	areas,	such	as	the	north	and	the	northeast,	are	lacking	in	it.	Overall,	Brazil	
is	 experiencing	 a	 shortage	 of	 skilled	 labor	 in	 important	 industries	 such	 as	 infrastructure	 and	
resource	extraction.	
Regarding	overall	competitiveness,	Brazil	has	demonstrated	tremendous	potential	but	 lingering	
inefficiencies.	The	country	is	home	to	a	sophisticated	business	community	and	has	the	advantages	
of	 a	 massive	 internal	 market.	 But	 its	 competitiveness	 is	 hindered	 by,	 among	 other	 things,	
infrastructure	deficiencies	that	cost	Brazilian	businesses	billions	of	dollars	annually.1
1	 According	to	a	2010	Morgan	Stanley	Blue	Paper,	Brazilian	fields	produce	grain	twice	as	fast	as	the	rest	of	the	world,	but	getting	
that	grain	to	port	across	unpaved	roads	can	cost	almost	half	its	value.	Meanwhile,	vast	mineral	deposits	remain	buried	deep	
within	 the	 earth	 for	want	 of	 railroads	 to	 transport	 the	 goods.	 Statistics	 support	 these	 anecdotes.	 The	 paper	 found	 the	 that	
Brazilian	infrastructure	investment	has	been	on	a	consistent	decline,	from	5.4	percent	of	GDP	in	the	1970s	down	to	2.1	percent	
in	the	2000s—only	slightly	above	the	estimated	2.0	percent	required	to	simply	maintain	the	existing	infrastructure	stock	(See	
Paiva	2010).	As	a	 result,	 the	World	Economic	Forum’s	Global	Competitiveness	Report	2013–2014	 ranks	Brazil	114th	of	148	
countries	in	quality	of	overall	transport	infrastructure	(World	Economic	Forum	2013).
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Drivers of German Foreign Trade 
In	 Germany	 the	 volume	 and	 structure	 of	 exports	 and	 imports	 are	 mainly	 determined	 by	 an	
abundance	 of	 capital,	 a	well-trained	work	 force,	 favorable	 unit	 labor	 costs,	 a	 high	 standard	 of	
scientific	and	technical	knowledge,	supply-chain	integration	within	Europe	and	the	lack	of	natural	
resources.	Hence	 the	German	 economy	 depends	 on	 importing	 raw	materials	 from	 abroad	 and	
exporting	manufactured	products	that	contain	a	high	degree	of	human	and	physical	capital.	
Germany	has	a	highly	skilled	and	specialized	labor	force,	which	can	in	particular	be	attributed	to	the	
country’s	system	of	vocational	education.	This	“dual	education	system”	combines	apprenticeships	
in	a	company	with	training	in	vocational	schools.	As	a	result,	Germany	can	be	described	as	an	
economy	that	is	well	endowed	in	skilled	labor	but	relatively	poorly	endowed	in	unskilled	labor.	
Thus	the	country	exports	goods	and	services	produced	with	the	help	of	skilled	labor	and	imports	
products	from	abroad	that	require	unskilled	labor.	In	terms	of	capital,	Germany	can	be	classified	
as	a	capital-rich	country,	and	therefore	theoretically	meant	to	export	capital-intensive	goods	and	
services.
Another	 driver	 of	 the	 volume	 and	 structure	 of	 German	 exports	 is	 the	 country’s	 high	 level	 of	
technology,	 which	 allows	 Germany	 to	 export	 high-tech	 products,	 knowledge	 and	 technology-
intensive	goods	and	services.	One	 indicator	of	German	technological	prowess	 is	 the	number	of	
annual	patent	applications.	In	2009,	Germany	ranked	fifth	in	the	number	of	patent	applications	per	
one	million	employed	persons,	ahead	of	all	other	large	industrial	countries	(Expertenkommission	
Forschung	und	Innovation,	2012).	
Despite	 being	 labor-poor	 in	 a	 global	 context,	 Germany	 benefits	 from	 favorable	 labor	 costs	 per	
unit.	Though	it	 is	a	high-wage	country,	growth	of	wages	over	the	past	15	years	has	been	lower	
than	in	other	developed	economies.	The	restraint	on	wages	is	rooted	primarily	in	a	period	of	high	
unemployment	and	structural	reform	of	the	labor	market	in	the	2000s,	as	well	as	a	weakening	of	
the	bargaining	power	of	German	unions.	
Following	reunification	in	1990,	unemployment	in	Germany	reached	double	digits	by	1994	and	
remained	 elevated	 for	more	 than	 a	 decade.	 Persistent	 high	 unemployment	 and	 the	 increasing	
possibility	 of	 outsourcing	 jobs	 to	 Central	 and	 Eastern	 Europe	 exhorted	 significant	 downward	
pressure	on	German	real	wages.	In	response	to	the	continuing	employment	crisis,	the	government,	
under	Chancellor	Gerhard	Schröder,	enacted	a	set	of	 labor	market	reforms	aimed	at	 increasing	
participation	in	the	labor	force	by	allowing	for	more	flexible	forms	of	employment	and	reducing	
benefits	to	the	long-term	jobless.	These	reforms	also	acted	to	slow	wage	growth.	Finally,	and	related	
to	these	structural	changes	of	the	German	economy,	the	unionization	of	the	labor	force	decreased	
significantly.	In	1990,	more	than	11	million	people	were	members	of	a	union.	By	2011,	membership	
had	dropped	to	6.15	million.
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Another	 driver	 of	German	 exports	 is	 its	membership	 in	 the	 EU	 and	 the	 eurozone.	Germany’s	
central	 location	 in	 Europe	 and	 high	 degree	 of	 integration	with	 neighboring	 countries	 through	
the	common	European	market	has	led	to	strong	growth	in	intra-industry	trade	between	Germany	
and	 other	 European	 countries.	 German	 producers	 draw	 on	 asupply	 chain	 that	 includes	 firms	
in	 many	 European	 countries	 and	makes	 use	 of	 advantageous	 product	 specialization	 and	 cost	
competitiveness	(i.e.,	lower	labor	costs	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe).	The	monetary	union	of	the	
eurozone	also	benefits	German	competitiveness	by	preventing	an	appreciation	of	the	currency.
In	a	separate	study,	the	Bertelmann	Stiftung	estimates	that	if	the	separate	German	currency	still	
existed,	it	would	have	appreciated	by	roughly	23	percent,	whereas	the	currencies	of	the	remaining	
countries	 of	 the	 eurozone	 would	 have	 been	 devalued	 by	 an	 average	 of	 nearly	 seven	 percent	
(Bertelsmann	 Stiftung,	 2013a).	 Such	 an	 increase	 in	 relative	 prices	would	 have	 had	 a	 negative	
impact	 on	German	exports.	At	 the	 same	 time,	German	 imports	would	have	 increased.	Being	a	
member	of	 the	single	European	currency,	Germany	does	not	suffer	 from	an	appreciation	of	 its	
currency	because	the	exports	of	all	17	countries	using	the	euro	are	more	or	less	balanced	to	the	
imports	–	at	least	until	2011.	
Evaluating	the	overall	competitiveness,	Germany	is	specifically	strong	in	macroeconomic	stability,	
capacity	for	innovation,	quantity	and	quality	of	local	suppliers,	judicial	independence,	intellectual	
property	protection	and	quality	of	overall	infrastructure.	Germany	maintains	a	large	trade	surplus	
and	a	current	account	surplus.
Figure 1: Labor costs per unit across countries and times (index: labor costs per 
unit in the base year 2000 = 100)
Source: OECD, calculations of the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA), Bonn.
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3. German and Brazilian Trade Policy
Brazilian Trade Policy
Brazilian	trade	policy	has	historically	been	protectionist,	dating	back	to	the	 import	substitution	
industrialization	 (ISI)	model	 of	 development	 employed	 during	 the	middle	 of	 the	 20th	 century.	
Since	the	market	 liberalization	of	 the	1980s,	Brazil	has	embarked	on	a	course	of	relative	trade	
openness,	 lowering	 tariffs	unilaterally	 and	pursuing	 regional	 trade	 integration	with	Argentina,	
Uruguay	and	Paraguay	via	Mercosul.	
Implementation	of	Brazilian	 trade	policy	 is	overseen	by	 the	Ministry	of	Development,	 Industry	
and	Trade,	the	minister	of	which	also	serves	as	the	chairman	of	the	Chamber	of	Foreign	Trade	
(CAMEX).	This	body	was	created	by	the	government	of	President	Fernando	Henrique	Cardoso	in	
1995	to	ensure	multi-agency	policy	coordination	as	well	as	to	advise	the	president	(Cantarino	da	
Costa	Ramos,	2010).	As	a	member	of	Mercosul,	Brazil	is	required	to	negotiate	new	trade	agreements	
with	the	regional	bloc	as	a	whole	rather	than	bilaterally.	After	being	stalled	for	a	number	of	years,	
EU-Mercosul	negotiations	restarted	in	2010.	
Brazil’s	current	trade	policy	still	has	attributes	inherited	from	its	ISI	period,	with	an	emphasis	on	
protection	of	import-competing	sectors,	notably	automobiles,	electrical	and	electronic	equipment,	
textiles,	clothing,	rubber	and	plastics	(Da	Motta	Vega,	2009).	Protection	generally	takes	the	form	
not	 only	 of	 tariffs	 but	 also	 of	 non-tariff	 barriers,	 including	 complex	 import	 licensing	 schemes,	
import	fees	and	anti-dumping	duties,	which	increased	from	63	measures	in	2008	to	83	measures	
in	mid-2012	(WTO,	2009;	WTO,	2013).2	
In	May	2010,	as	a	 result	of	a	deteriorating	 trade	balance	 in	manufactured	goods,	 the	Brazilian	
government	introduced	a	25	percent	preference	margin	in	government	procurement	for	domestic	
bidders	as	well	as	an	increase	in	import	tariffs	on	car	parts	(Cornet	et	al.,	2010).	In	2011,	Brazil	
implemented	a	30	percent	tax	on	imported	vehicles	while	exempting	domestically	produced	cars	
and	trucks,	in	a	measure	originally	intended	to	last	one	year	but	extended	for	five	additional	years	
in	2012.	These	measures	have	resulted	in	a	formal	request	for	consultations	at	the	WTO	filed	by	
the	European	Union	on	December	19,	2013.	
Brazil’s	trade	policy	also	features	export	promotion.	Tools	for	this	include	the	Export	Financing	
Program	(PROEX),	primarily	targeting	small	and	medium-sized	enterprises	that	otherwise	struggle	
to	obtain	credit,	as	well	as	the	Export	Guarantee	Fund	(FGE).	In	2012,	PROEX	provided	US$4.88	
billion	 to	 Brazilian	 exporters.	 Between	 2009	 and	 2012,	 FGE	 supported	 253	 export	 operations	
totaling	US$32.6	billion.3	Finally,	the	Brazilian	Development	Bank	(BNDES)	has	several	programs	
in	place	to	ease	the	interest	rate	burden	on	exporters	(WTO,	2013).	
2	 More	than	half	of	the	anti-dumping	measures	in	place	in	2011	were	directed	against	China	(Lima/Ragir	2011).
3	 FGE	supported	these	export	operations	by	guaranteeing	up	to	100	percent	of	the	commercial,	political,	and	extraordinary	risk.
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German Trade Policy
Germany’s	preference	for	global	integration	is	also	a	well-accepted	guideline	for	its	policymakers.	
German	trade	policy	is	formed	and	implemented	by	the	Federal	German	Ministry	on	Economics	
and	Technology	 (BMWi).	The	ministry	has	 fostered	a	number	of	 initiatives	 to	 improve	German	
competitiveness.4	The	German	Office	of	Economics	and	Export	Control	(BAFA)	supports	small	and	
medium-sized	 enterprises	 and	 oversees	 export	 and	 import	 regulations	 (BAFA,	 2012).	Germany	
Trade	and	Invest	(GTAI)	is	an	agency	that	promotes	Germany	as	a	location	for	doing	business	and	
assists	companies	operating	in	foreign	markets.	
However,	Germany	cannot	control	its	own	trade	policy.	As	part	of	the	European	Union,	it	is	only	
through	the	intergovernmental	institution	of	the	Council	of	the	European	Union	(CEU),	as	well	as	
the	supranational	European	Commission	 (EC)	and	European	Parliament	 (EP),	 that	 trade	policy	
involving	Germany	 (setting	 of	 tariffs	 or	 negotiation	 in	 the	WTO	 and	 other	 pacts,	 for	 example)	
can	be	created.	While	the	EU	considers	trade	liberalization	essential	to	further	economic	growth,	
there	 are	 also	 countries	 and	 industries	 that	 represent	 important	 protectionist	 interests	within	
the	union.	The	stance	of	a	single	member	country,	even	an	important	one	such	as	Germany,	can	
often	remain	unclear	as	it	is	hidden	behind	the	veil	of	the	common	EU	policy	that	represents	a	
consensus	among	28	national	policy	preferences.	The	EU	has	prioritized	the	liberalization	in	areas	
such	as	trade	in	services,	public	procurement	and	protection	of	intellectual	property	rights.	It	is	
also	concerned	with	securing	supplies	of	raw	materials	and	energy	for	the	industrial	countries	(EC,	
2011).	However,	the	EU	also	pursues	a	policy	of	protecting	certain	industries,	notably	agriculture,	
via	high	most-favored	nation	(MFN)	tariffs	as	well	as	provision	of	subsidies	to	European	farmers,	
which	has	consistently	frustrated	developing	countries	(WTO,	2013a).	
The	 EU	Generalized	 System	 of	 Preferences	 (GSP)	 grants	 preferential	 access	 to	 the	 EU	market	
for	developing	countries.	The	EU	revised	the	GSP	in	2013	to	 focus	on	assisting	 least-developed	
countries	 rather	 than	middle-income	 countries.	 As	 of	 January	 1,	 2014,	 a	 number	 of	 countries	
that	have	been	classified	as	high	or	upper-middle-income	countries	no	longer	benefit	from	these	
preferences.	Brazil,	along	with	all	Mercosul	members	except	Paraguay,	 is	among	the	countries	
that	have	lost	this	preferential	access.	
4	 The	initiative	features	four	elements:	1)	Supporting	small	and	medium-sized	German	companies	abroad,	particularly	in	emerging	
markets;	 2)	 Exhausting	 all	 the	mechanisms	 available	 to	 trade	 policymakers,	 including	 a	marketing	 campaign	 for	 investing	
in	 Germany,	 company	 match-making,	 and	 the	 realignment	 of	 export	 development	 schemes	 and	 export	 credit	 guarantees;	
3)	Reducing	bureaucracy	by	abolishing	unnecessary	export	regulations	and	accelerating	the	process	for	granting	export	and	
investment	credit	guarantees;	4)	Strengthening	the	international	trade	framework	by	working	towards	the	successful	conclusion	
of	the	Doha	Round	and	the	negotiations	about	the	Anti-Counterfeit	Trade	Agreement	(ACTA)	as	well	as	concluding	bilateral	trade	
agreements	with	emerging	economies	in	Asia	and	Latin	America.
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4. Overview of Brazilian-German Bilateral Trade
Brazilian-German	trade	has	consistently	 increased	over	the	past	decade,	 though	growth	slowed	
following	 the	 economic	 crisis	 of	 2008–2009.	 Of	 major	 EU	member	 states,	 Germany	 is	 by	 far	
Brazil’s	largest	trading	partner,	both	in	terms	of	imports	and	exports.	Germany	is	currently	Brazil’s	
fourth	largest	trading	partner	behind	China,	the	US	and	Argentina	(GED,	2013).
The	German-Brazilian	connection	fuels	trade	between	the	EU	and	South	America.	In	2010,	Germany	
accounted	for	one	third	of	all	Brazilian	trade	with	the	EU,	and	this	figure	likely	underestimates	the	
total	value	owing	to	the	so-called	Rotterdam	effect.5
Brazil’s	major	exports	to	Germany	include	iron	ore,	soy	and	soy	products,	coffee	products,	meat,	
copper	 and	 crude	 oil	 (German	 Foreign	 Office,	 2012).	 While	 raw	 materials	 predominate,	 some	
machinery	 and	 aircraft	 parts	 also	 figure	 into	 Brazil’s	 German	 export	 portfolio.	 The	majority	 of	
Brazilian	exports	to	the	EU	overall	are	likewise	in	raw	commodities.	Twenty-one	percent	of	eurozone	
ore	and	mineral	imports	originate	in	Brazil,	as	do	11	percent	of	agricultural	imports	(EC,	2012).
Key	German	exports	to	Brazil	include	machinery,	cars	and	car	parts,	as	well	as	basic	chemicals	
and	pharmaceutical	products	(German	Foreign	Office,	2012).	In	contrast	with	the	Brazilian	export	
portfolio,	 German	 exports	 to	 Brazil	 are	 overwhelmingly	 manufactured	 goods,	 either	 for	 final	
consumption	or	intermediate	goods	and	capital	goods	for	Brazilian	businesses.	Once	again	here,	
German-Brazilian	trade	is	indicative	of	the	greater	EU-South	American	relationship.	In	2011,	for	
example,	88.5	percent	of	Mercosul	imports	from	the	EU	were	manufactured	goods,	with	trade	for	
machinery	and	in	transport	equipment	accounting	for	49.2	percent	of	the	total	(EC	2012).	
In	terms	of	overall	value,	Brazilian-German	trade	is	relatively	balanced.	Brazil	had	a	trade	surplus	
with	Germany	seven	of	 the	eight	years	between	2003	and	2010,	peaking	at	US$2.78	billion	 in	
2007.	This	surplus	has	averaged	only	US$1.1	billion.	Brazil’s	trade	surplus	with	Germany	appears	
to	reflect	a	tide	change	as	Brazil	traded	at	a	deficit	with	Germany	from	2000	to	2003.	
The	transition	does	not	reflect	a	decrease	in	Brazilian	appetite	for	German	goods.	On	the	contrary,	
German	exports	to	Brazil	nearly	tripled	between	2000	and	2010,	from	US$4.43	billion	to	US$11.75	
billion.	 Increases	 in	 Brazilian	 exports	 simply	 outpaced	 increases	 in	 Brazilian	 imports	 from	
Germany.	
5	 The	 Rotterdam	 effect	 refers	 to	 goods	 destined	 for	 a	 given	 country	 that	 enter	 the	 eurozone	 in	 third	 countries	 such	 as	 the	
Netherlands.	 In	cases	where	 these	goods	are	 then	 traded	 to	Germany,	 these	 transactions	are	 recorded	as	Dutch	 trade	with	
Brazil,	and	subsequently	as	eurozone	trade	between	the	Netherlands	and	Germany.
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Bilateral	trade	flows	are	complementary	and	mutually	beneficial.	From	the	German	perspective,	
exporting	to	Brazil	offers	domestic	manufacturers	the	opportunity	to	reach	the	country’s	growing	
middle	 class—a	massive	 new	 group	 of	 consumers.	 There	 is	 also	 a	 growing	 class	 of	 extremely	
wealthy	Brazilian	consumers	who	represent	a	prime	market	for	high-end	German	goods.	Finally,	
increased	business	activity	in	Brazil	generates	opportunities	for	German	intermediate	goods	and	
capital	goods	such	as	chemicals	and	machine	parts	and	equipment	that	make	up	the	backbone	of	
the	German	exporting	sector.
Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung, Global Economic Dynamics
Figure 2: Overview of Brazilian-German trade
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From	the	Brazilian	perspective,	exporting	 to	Germany	helps	Brazil	diversify	 its	 trade	portfolio.	
Without	 trade	 to	 Europe,	 Brazilian	 commodity	 exporters	 could	 be	 particularly	 vulnerable	 to	 a	
downturn	in	China.	While	Brazil	executes	a	greater	volume	of	trade	with	both	Argentina	and	the	
US,	Brazil	also	competes	with	these	nations	on	exports	such	as	soy,	beef	and	hydrocarbons.	Not	
only	can	this	create	trade	policy	friction,	but	it	also	means	Brazil	must	find	additional	consumers	
for	such	goods.	Germany	fits	this	description	neatly,	as	it	does	not	compete	with	Brazil	in	most	
commodity	sectors.
German	manufactures	rely	on	commodity	imports	to	generate	their	finished	products.	A	massive,	
politically	 stable	 commodity	 producer	 such	 as	 Brazil	 can	 offer	 resource	 security	 for	 Germany.	
Meanwhile,	German	demand	for	Brazilian	commodities	not	only	expands	the	quantity	of	annual	
sales,	but	also	helps	bid	up	the	global	price—both	to	the	advantage	of	Brazil.
5. Complications in Brazilian-German-Trade
Despite—or	perhaps	because	of—the	complementary	nature	of	the	two	countries’	factor	endowments,	
the	EU	and	Brazil	are	involved	in	a	series	of	long-standing	trade	disputes.	Brazil	and	the	EU	have	
been	involved	in	12	cases	before	the	WTO;	seven	of	them	were	brought	by	Brazil,	while	the	EU	has	
acted	as	a	complainant	five	times	(for	an	overview,	see	Table	1).	
While	Brazilian	complaints	have	focused	on	the	EU’s	import	restrictions	on	agricultural	products	
and	raw	materials,	the	EU	has	objected	to	what	it	sees	as	Brazilian	protectionism	on	intermediate	
inputs	 and	 final	 goods.	Non-tariff	 and	 behind-the-border	 trade	 barriers	 feature	 prominently	 in	
most	of	the	disputes.	With	the	EU	still	struggling	to	recover	from	the	fallout	of	the	financial	and	
economic	crisis	 that	began	 in	2008,	 the	risk	of	protectionism	and	new	trade	disputes	remains	
high.	Experts	fear	that	as	the	Doha	Development	Agenda	negotiations	remain	in	a	stalemate,	the	
risk	of	 trade	dispute	settlement	 initiations	rises	as	well.	As	one	diplomat	put	 it,	 “The	 less	you	
negotiate,	the	more	you	litigate”	(Miles	2012).
In	the	current	Doha	round,	Brazil	and	the	EU	hold	opposing	views	on	many	crucial	issues.	Most	
importantly,	 they	disagree	on	 further	concessions	 for	agricultural	and	 industrial	products.	Due	
to	 the	 high	 competitiveness	 of	 its	 farmers,	 Brazil	 sees	 huge	 potential	 to	 increase	 the	 global	
Figure 3: Overview of trade drivers
For Germany For Brazil
Large growing market for German goods , Key trade diversification from USA & China
Brazilian development means increased trade opportu-
nities for German firms
, German expertise key for Brazilian infrastructure 
development
Maintain national resource security for manufacturing 
sector
, German commodity demand increases quantity/prices 
of Brazilian exports
Global leader in green energy exports , Dedicated to green development
Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung
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market	share	of	its	agricultural	products.	Therefore,	it	has	been	particularly	concerned	with	the	
liberalization	of	agricultural	markets.	Brazil	has	taken	a	fairly	aggressive	stance	on	market	access,	
domestic	support	as	well	as	export	subsidies	(Nogueira,	2009).	Developed	economies,	in	particular	
the	 EU	 and	 the	US	 have	 offered	 cuts	 but	 they	 have	 been	 rather	 unrelenting	 about	 employing	
the	special	safeguard	measures	(SSM)	that	allow	for	the	temporary	use	of	import	restrictions	on	
certain	products	(for	example,	sugar)	in	case	of	a	sudden	surge	in	imports.
6. Towards a Mercosul-EU Free Trade Agreement?
Given	 their	 complementary	 and	 growing	 trade	 ties,	 Germany	 and	 Brazil	 would	 both	 stand	 to	
benefit	from	closer,	direct	bilateral	trade	regulations.	However,	given	the	former’s	membership	in	
the	EU	and	the	latter’s	association	with	Mercosul,	an	FTA	would	require	a	larger	accord	between	
the	two	blocs.	As	early	as	1995,	the	EU	and	Mercosul	signed	a	framework	agreement	and	initiated	
a	dialogue	aiming	to	establish	free	trade	between	the	two	blocs.	Since	then,	however,	negotiations	
regarding	a	possible	EU-Mercosul	FTA	have	oscillated	between	new	pushes	for	an	agreement	and	
lackluster	attempts	to	hammer	out	the	details.	
On	May	29,	1992,	a	Joint	Institutional	Cooperation	Agreement	was	signed	by	the	EU	and	the	(then)	
four	Mercosul	countries.	In	July	1998,	the	EU	decided	to	negotiate	an	FTA	with	Mercosul	and	Chile;	
meetings	and	discussions	started	that	same	year.	Negotiations	have	since	oscillated	between	new	
thrusts	to	fix	the	agreement	and	lackluster	attempts	to	hammer	out	the	details	(Flôres,	2013a).	
During	this	period	of	more	than	15	years,	not	many	formal	studies	have	been	made	on	the	likely	
impact	of	the	FTA.	
Table 1: Brazilian–EU Trade Disputes before the WTO
No. Complainant Respondent Issue
DS69 Brazil EU EU tariff quota on frozen poultry
DS81 EU Brazil Brazilian measures regulating the import of cars and car parts 
DS116 EU Brazil New payment terms introduced by the Brazilian Central Bank
DS154 Brazil EU EU special preferential treatment for soluble coffee
DS183 EU Brazil Brazil’s import measurers for textiles
DS209 Brazil EU EU special preferential treatment for soluble coffee
DS219 Brazil EU EU anti-dumping duties on iron imports from Brazil
DS266 Brazil* EU EU subsidies for the sugar industry
DS269 Brazil** EU EU tariff reclassification of frozen poultry
DS332 EU Brazil Brazilian measures regulating the import of tires
DS409 Brazil EU EU seizure of generic drugs destined for Brazil
DS472 EU Brazil Brazilian taxation and charges on certain manufactured goods
* Together with Thailand and Australia.
** Together with Thailand.
Source: Bertelsmann Stiftung based on WTO data (as of March 11, 2014).
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In	a	pervasive	partial-equilibrium	analysis,	Calfat	and	Flôres	(2006)	show	that	potential	EU	gains	
from	 such	 an	 agreement	 are	 much	 more	 widespread,	 in	 particular	 for	 several	 manufactured	
goods,	while	Mercosul	will	reap	advantages	from	a	number	of	commodity	exports.	In	spite	of	the	
significant	trade	deviation	to	China	by	most	Mercosul	members	since	the	time	of	the	study,	the	
evaluations	are	still	valuable	as	upper	bounds	for	gains	at	the	individual	product	level.	
Flôres	 and	Marconini	 (2003)	 argued	 that	many	 synergies	 could	be	 found	outside	 the	 classical	
realm	of	agriculture.	Migration	of	human	capital—a	ticklish	issue	for	the	EU—could	bear	interesting	
and	rewarding	outcomes	 for	both	sides;	 telecommunication	services	are	another	potential	win-
win	area.	
Negotiations	officially	reopened	in	May	2010,	with	Brazil	emerging	as	a	key	leader	in	the	dialogues.	
Both	Brazil	 and	Germany	could	 realize	significant	gains	 from	an	agreement:	Brazilian-German	
trade	flows	accounted	for	more	than	one-fifth	of	EU-Mercosul	trade	in	2010.	
Brazil	would	very	much	like	to	complete	an	FTA	with	a	more	developed	economy.	But	difficulties	
and	hesitations	still	plague	the	advancement	of	the	process.	On	the	Mercosul	side,	Argentina,	and	
to	a	lesser	extent	Venezuela,	have	posed	quite	a	few	demands	and	objections.	From	the	European	
side,	 despite	 the	 extremely	 positive	 rhetoric,	 not	much	 enthusiasm	has	 been	 demonstrated	 in	
terms	of	concessions,	which	actually	mimic	the	pattern	of	those	offered	long	ago.
Moreover,	two	new	variables	are	at	stake.	
The	first	is	China,	a	new	and	massive	market	that	has	considerably	eased	the	anxiety	of	Mercosul	
commodity	exporters—especially	meat	producers—making	the	EU	a	still	attractive	but	less	crucial	
market	than	it	was	ten	years	ago.	On	the	EU	side,	beyond	the	several	crises	still	occupying	the	
larger	fraction	of	the	Brussels	staff,	in	the	trade	arena,	the	prospects	of	a	Trans-Atlantic	Trade	and	
Investment	Partnership	(TTIP)	is	drawing	considerable	attention.	This	is	a	complicated,	ambitious	
attempt,	 with	 no	 clear	 outcome	 but	 giving	 way	 to	 an	 extremely	 time	 and	 human	 resource-
consuming	process.	
A	 study	 by	 the	 Bertelsmann	 Stiftung	 and	 the	 IFO-Institute	 concluded	 that	 in	 global	 economic	
terms,	both	the	US	and	the	EU	would	profit	from	a	comprehensive	TTIP	(Felbermayr,	2013),	with	
southern	EU	member	states	and	the	UK	being	the	main	beneficiaries.	Countries	outside	the	TTIP,	
especially	those	with	very	close	trade	relations	with	one	of	the	two	blocs,	such	as	Mexico,	would	
face	trade	contraction	that	would	result	in	decreases	to	real	income	and	employment.
The	study	forecasts	Brazilian	exports	to	the	EU	to	contract	by	9.4	percent	if	the	TTIP	is	concluded,	
and	Brazilian	exports	to	Germany	to	contract	by	7.9	percent.	The	study	also	finds	that	Brazilian	
exports	to	the	US	could	decline	by	as	much	as	29.7	percent.	Overall,	these	contractions	could	cost	
Brazil	more	than	two	percent	of	per-capita	GDP.	
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The	 impact	on	Brazil	 is	somewhat	debatable	and	preliminary,	a	general	evaluation	with	which	
Flôres	(2013b)	agrees.	The	key	issue,	more	than	trade	deviation,	is	the	envisaged	unified	platform	
of	technical	norms,	rules	and	standards	for	manufactures,	services	and	commodities.	This	implies	
that	Brazil,	and	Mercosul	as	well,	should	set	a	task	force	to	deeply	analyze,	out	of	the	potentially	
common	norms	 that	could	result6,	 those	with	which	 it	already	complies,	 those	 it	would	 like	 to	
adopt,	and	those	the	country	sees	no	point	in	following.	In	conducting	this	effort,	Germany,	with	its	
close	ties	with	Brazilian	industry	and	its	superior	technical	expertise,	could	be	a	friendly	partner	
to	Brazil.
In	February	2012,	German	Foreign	Minister	Guido	Westerwelle	visited	Brazilian	Foreign	Minister	
Antonio	Patriota,	and	the	two	jointly	called	for	progress	in	the	EU-Mercosul	FTA	dialogues.	While	
they	conceded	that	Europe’s	subsidies	to	farmers	represent	a	crucial	dividing	point,	both	made	
clear	 that	 their	 governments	 supported	 an	 agreement.	At	 a	 summit	meeting	 in	 January	 2013,	
German	Chancellor	Angela	Merkel	won	the	commitment	of	Brazilian	President	Dilma	Rousseff	
and	 Argentine	 President	 Cristina	 Fernández	 de	 Kirchner	 to	 exchange	 concrete	 proposals	 for	
lowering	trade	barriers	by	the	end	of	2013	(Emmott,	2013),	something	Brussels	has	failed	to	do.
On	 February	 24,	 2014,	 Rousseff	 met	 with	 EU	 leaders	 to	 discuss	 negotiations	 (GMF,	 2014).	
Mercosul	members	had	met	earlier	 that	month	to	discuss	a	 joint	proposal	on	tariff	 reductions.	
Additionally,	discussions	of	the	potential	for	negotiations	to	move	forward	without	Argentina;	a	so-
called	“two-speed”	negotiation	process	have	emerged.	While	this	approach	would	require	revising	
Mercosul	rules,	Brazil	and	Uruguay	have	hinted	at	preparations	to	do	so	if	Argentina	continues	to	
pursue	a	more	protectionist	trade	policy	(Mercopress,	2014b).	Brazil’s	powerful	Confederation	of	
Industries	(CNI)	has	recently	come	out	in	support	of	this	idea,	noting	that	FTAs	with	the	EU	and	
US	are	necessary	to	maintain	Brazil’s	competitiveness	(Ridout,	2014).	Paraguay	also	indicated	an	
inclination	to	follow	the	other	two	members.	
Yet	obstacles	remain.	European	farm	lobbies	place	a	€25	billion	price	tag	on	a	potential	EU-Mercosul	
FTA,	 claiming	 that	European	 farmers	will	 suffer	 extensive	 losses	 in	 the	 event	 of	 liberalization	
of	 the	agricultural	 sector	 (Mercopress,	2011).	The	EC’s	own	assessment	 found	 the	 losses	 to	be	
considerably	lower,	ranging	between	€1	billion	and	€3	billion	(Burrell	et	al.,	2011).	The	agricultural	
lobby,	however,	is	unlikely	to	be	convinced	by	the	calculations	of	the	EC—a	known	supporter	of	
free	trade.
These	developments	suggest	Brazil	and	Germany	should	exploit	deeper	bilateral	relations,	without	
violating	the	rules	of	the	existing	customs	unions,	and	that	this	would	create	more	opportunities	
and	targeted	business	ventures	in	a	traditional	relationship	that	is	fortunately	blooming	again.
6	 We	say	“potentially	common	norms	that	could	result”	because	in	many	areas,	such	as	GMOs,	the	Internet	realm	and	chemical	
goods,	it	is	hard	to	conceive	a	EU-US	harmonization	(see	also	Flôres,	2013b).
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7. 21st-Century Opportunities for a 21st-Century Relationship
The	trade	relationship	between	Brazil	and	Germany	is	not	just	characterized	by	complementary	
endowments	and	competition	between	national	industries.	It	also	features	significant	opportunities	
in	so-called	“new”	or	“21st-century”	trade—many	of	which	remain	to	be	seized.	
New	trade	theory	was	developed	as	early	as	the	1970s,	based	on	the	observation	that	an	increasing	
share	of	international	trade	was	taking	place	within	industries	and	could	not	be	explained	by	the	
classical	theories	of	comparative	advantage	and	differences	in	factor	endowments	(Krugman,	1979).	
Intra-industry	trade,	countries	trading	final	goods	but	also	parts	and	components	within	the	same	
industry,	is	seen	to	be	driven	by	factors	such	as	monopolistic	competition,	consumer	preference	for	
diversity,	increasing	returns	to	scale	and	agglomeration	effects.	Intra-industry	trade	accounts	for	a	
large	part	of	the	exponential	growth	of	international	trade	in	the	age	of	globalization	(beginning	in	
the	1990s),	as	open	borders	as	well	as	falling	costs	of	transportation	and	communication	allowed	
for	supply	chain	integration	across	countries.	
Brazil	and	Germany	have	taken	remarkably	different	approaches	to	 these	developments.	While	
Germany	has	embraced	integration	into	regional	global	supply	chains,	Brazil	has	generally	favored	
vertical	integration—the	linking	of	various	stages	of	production	within	a	country.	
For	Germany,	supply	chain	integration	came	naturally	given	the	country’s	central	position	in	the	
common	European	market,	scarcity	of	resources	and	high	degree	of	industrial	specialization.	The	
opening	of	Central	and	Eastern	Europe’s	economies	in	the	1990s	provided	a	special	opportunity	
for	German	businesses	to	tap	not	only	new	markets	but	also	new	sources	of	relatively	cheap	labor.	
Outsourcing	or	relocating	parts	of	production	to	Germany’s	eastern	neighbors	allowed	companies	
to	focus	on	the	stages	of	production	most	efficiently	done	at	home,	increasing	overall	productivity.	
In	Brazil,	vertical	integration	is	largely	a	relic	of	the	ISI	model	of	development	of	decades	past.	
The	country’s	protection	of	industries	through	tariff	and	non-tariff	measures	and	preference	for	
domestic	industry	is	one	important	factor	preventing	supply	chain	integration.	Another	key	factor	
is	its	geographic	distance	from	the	world	economy’s	most	dynamic	and	integrated	regions	(Europe,	
North	America,	East	Asia),	combined	with	poor	 logistics	 infrastructure.	With	the	establishment	
of	Mercosul	 in	 1991,	 Brazil	 bet	 on	 its	 own	model	 of	 regional	 integration.	Mercosul	 has	 led	 to	
some	 supply-chain	 integration	 in	 the	 region—a	 notable	 example	 is	 the	 automotive	 industry	 in	
Brazil	and	Argentina—but	Mercosul’s	closed	approach	to	the	outside	and	long	stagnation	in	terms	
of	deepening	internal	 integration	has	severely	 limited	the	supply	chain	integration	of	Brazilian	
industries.	Interestingly,	the	only	industrial	segment	in	Brazil	with	strong	international	integration,	
aerospace	 (heavily	concentrated	around	aircraft	manufacturer	Embraer),	 is	also	one	of	 the	 few	
Brazilian	manufacturing	segments	experiencing	strong	growth	in	recent	years.	
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Considering	the	range	of	industries	present	in	both	countries,	increased	supply	chain	integration	
between	Brazil	and	Germany	should	present	significant	opportunities	for	both	countries,	especially	
in	the	manufacturing	sector.	For	Brazil,	transfer	of	German	knowledge	and	technology	could	help	
firms	become	more	efficient.	For	Germany,	Brazil	presents	not	just	an	attractive	market	but	also	a	
potential	source	of	inputs	(those	incorporating	labor	and	natural	resources)	and	even	technology	
in	areas	where	Brazilian	firms	have	found	niches	(e.g.	biofuels,	aerospace).	
Supply	chain	integration	is	also	linked	to	another	important	new	theme	in	international	trade:	trade	
in	services.	The	production	of	final	goods	in	a	modern,	globally	integrated	industry	incorporates	
not	just	a	large	number	of	components	or	intermediate	goods	but	also	a	range	of	services,	many	of	
which	can	be	globally	sourced.	These	tradable	services	include	diverse	activities	such	as	transport,	
logistics,	IT,	finance,	insurance	and	design.	In	addition	to	such	business-oriented	services,	tourism	
is	also	a	growing	tradable	service.	
As	trade	in	services	has	grown,	Brazil	has	not	fully	taken	advantage	of	the	resulting	opportunities.	
This	 is	no	surprise,	 as	business	services	 tend	 to	be	closely	 linked	 to	 supply	chain	 integration.	
Germany	however,	is	also	relatively	poorly	integrated	in	global	services	trade,	as	many	important	
sectors	 remain	 closed.	 Hence,	 services	 present	 an	 opportunity	 for	 both	 countries	 to	 deepen	
integration	with	each	other	as	well	as	with	the	rest	of	the	world.	Tourism	also	presents	a	bilateral	
opportunity.	Brazil,	with	its	plentiful	sunshine	and	lush	beaches,	should	be	able	to	tap	into	the	
market	for	sun-hungry	Germans,	rivaling	the	Caribbean	and	Southeast	Asia	as	a	warm-weather	
tourist	destination.	By	the	same	token,	Germany	has	so	far	missed	out	on	the	dramatic	increase	in	
Brazilians	traveling	abroad.	Given	that	many	Brazilians	are	of	German	descent	and	the	country	has	
much	to	offer	in	terms	of	history	and	culture,	there	is	a	great	opportunity	to	attract	more	tourists.	
Another	interesting	area	of	opportunity	for	integration	between	Germany	and	Brazil	is	in	the	area	
of	green	energy	and	biofuels.	Both	countries	are	leaders	in	subsectors	in	this	area	but	cooperation	
has	been	limited.	Brazil	has	been	leading	 in	the	development	of	ethanol	made	from	sugarcane	
(a	more	 efficient	 source	 than	 corn	 or	 other	 plants)	 and	 related	 technologies	 such	 as	 flex-fuel	
engines	(that	run	on	gasoline,	ethanol	or	any	mixture	of	the	two)	and	electricity	from	the	biomass	
byproducts	 of	 sugarcane	 (rather	 than	being	net	 consumers	 of	 electricity,	Brazilian	 sugar	mills	
actually	supply	significant	amounts	to	the	grid).	Germany,	meanwhile,	has	been	a	leader	in	the	
development	 of	 solar	 panels	 and	wind	 turbines,	which	 are	 clearly	 an	 attractive	 energy	 option	
for	Brazil.	However,	 instead	 of	 benefiting	 from	each	 other’s	 strengths,	 each	 country	has	 taken	
a	protectionist	approach	towards	the	other’s	products,	with	costs	for	both	economies	as	well	as	
the	environment.	Given	that	Brazil	and	Germany	both	aspire	to	be	leaders	on	the	global	climate	
agenda,	greater	cooperation	 in	 this	area	should	be	a	political	priority.	 In	 the	20th	century,	 the	
two	countries	cooperated	in	the	development	of	nuclear	energy,	with	the	German	firm	Siemens	
supplying	 the	reactors	 for	Brazil’s	nuclear	plant	 in	Agra	dos	Reis.	Why	not	embark	on	similar	
cooperation	on	energy	sources	for	the	21st	century?	
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This	chapter	outlines	the	key	issues	influencing	financial	flows	and	investment	between	Germany	
and	Brazil.	Section	1	reviews	the	main	factors	influencing	international	financial	flows,	as	revealed	
by	the	relevant	literature,	while	Section	2	describes	and	analyzes	data	on	direct	foreign	investment	
and	international	portfolio	investment,	with	a	particular	focus	on	Brazil	and	Germany.	Section	3	
analyzes	the	link	between	macroeconomic	stability	and	international	financial	flows,	particularly	
in	 light	 of	 recent	 Brazilian	 exchange	 rate	 volatility,	 and	 concludes	 by	 briefly	 considering	 the	
potential	benefits	of	macroeconomic	policy	harmonization.	
1. The Microeconomics of International Financial Flows
The	financial	decisions	of	foreign	investors	are	influenced	by	expected	risks	and	returns,	as	is	the	
case	of	any	financial	flow.	The	economic	role	of	international	financial	flows	is	to	transfer	savings	
between	countries.	According	to	Lucas	(1990),	one	should	thus	expect	large	capital	flows	from	rich	
to	poor	countries,	given	that	the	lower	ratio	of	capital	per	worker	in	poor	countries	would	imply	
larger	marginal	returns	to	capital.	However,	as	Reinhart	and	Rogoff	(2004)	noted,	external	debt	per	
capita	does	not	seem	to	follow	this	logic.	Rather,	the	larger	the	income	per	capita	of	a	country,	the	
larger	tends	to	be	its	external	debt	per	capita.	Gertler	and	Rogoff	(1989,	1990)	show	that	there	is	
evidence	of	expanding	capital	flows	from	poor	to	rich	countries,	while	Alfaro	et	al.	(2003)	present	
evidence	of	increasing	direct	foreign	investment	in	countries	with	high	per	capita	income.
Finally,	Reinhard	and	Rogoff	 (2004)	 found	 that	a	group	of	20	or	so	emerging-market	countries	
receive	the	bulk	of	financial	flows	from	richer	countries,	with	the	remaining	developing	countries	
generally	receiving	funds	through	aid	and	direct	foreign	investment.	These	empirical	disagreements	
with	Lucas’s	expectations	regarding	capital	flows	have	come	to	be	known	as	the	“Lucas	Paradox.”	
While	this	could	be	partially	related	to	the	phenomenon	of	the	“home	bias	puzzle”	(reviewed	in	
Lewis,	1999,	this	refers	to	the	preference	of	investors	to	invest	in	their	country	of	origin),	there	are	
several	additional	factors	involved,	some	of	which	are	discussed	below.	
Scarcity of Human Capital and Natural Resources
Contrary	to	Lucas’s	postulation,	the	returns	to	capital	are	not	necessarily	higher	in	poor	countries.	
One	key	reason	is	that	equipment	and	physical	capital	in	general	are	complementary	factors	of	
production	to	human	capital	and	natural	resources.	Consequently,	the	relative	scarcity	of	human	
capital	in	many	poor	countries	and	of	natural	resources	in	wealthier	ones,	decreases	the	marginal	
product	of	physical	capital.
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This	contention	is	supported	by	Caselli	and	Feyrer	(2007),	who	developed	a	methodology	to	correct	
the	marginal	product	of	capital	(MPC)	that	accounts	for	its	complementarities	with	human	capital	
and	natural	 resources.	 They	 find	 that	 although	 there	 are	 significant	 differentials	 in	 calculated	
MPC	between	rich	and	poor	countries	according	to	“naïve”	methodologies	(11.4	in	rich	countries	
against	 27.2	 in	 poor	 ones),	 corrections	 for	 the	 complementarities	 between	 capital	 and	 human	
capital	as	well	as	natural	resources	largely	equalizes	them	(8.4	for	rich	countries	against	6.9	for	
poor	countries),	suggesting	in	fact	that	rich	countries	may	have	a	somewhat	higher	MPC.
If	 capital,	 despite	 being	 the	 relatively	 mobile	 factor	 of	 production,	 must	 have	 complementary	
human	capital	(and/or	natural	resources),	one	may	ask	whether	migration	of	workers	could	not	be	
an	important	force	equalizing	marginal	products.	The	recent	intensification	of	international	labor	
migration	suggests	that	it	is,	to	some	extent,	but	that	there	are	still	restrictions	and	constraints.	
These	 include	conflicts	 (religious,	 ethnic)	and	pecuniary	and	non-pecuniary	costs	of	migration	
(legal	 restrictions,	 differences	 of	 cultural	 values,	 habits,	 loss	 of	 relations	 and	 network,	 lack	 of	
information	etc.).
Brazil	 has	 ample	 natural	 resources,	 but	 its	 dearth	 of	 human	 capital	may	 discourage	 potential	
investors,	at	least	in	the	short	and	medium	terms.	The	country’s	education	system	does	not	provide	
the	necessary	number	of	qualified	workers,	nor	has	migration	recently	been	able	to	fill	this	gap.
Institutional Quality
Another	 factor	behind	 the	 relative	scarcity	of	capital	 in	poor	countries	 is	 the	 increased	risk	of	
investment.	 Papaionnau	 (2004,	 2009)	 examined	 the	 financial	 flow	 data	 from	 banks	 of	 140	
(industrial,	 emerging	 and	 underdeveloped)	 countries.	 His	 main	 finding	 was	 that	 institutional	
quality	is	a	key	correlate	to	foreign	bank	lending.	A	country	with	poorly	performing	institutions,	
including	weak	property	rights	and	high	risks	of	expropriation,	 legal	 inefficiency,	bureaucratic	
corruption,	 etc.,	 inhibits	 foreign	bank	 lending.	 In	 effect,	 these	 factors	 act	 as	 (uncertain)	 taxes,	
restricting	capital	inflows.	On	the	other	hand,	political	liberalization,	privatization,	an	independent	
banking	system	and	similar	structural	characteristics	enable	an	economy	to	attract	substantially	
more	foreign	bank	capital.	
Papaionnau	(2009)	also	tested	for	informational	asymmetries	and	ethno-linguistic	ties	as	control	
variables	(see	also	Glick	and	Rose,	2002),	but	the	institutional	factors	remained	prominent.	Lane	
(2003)	arrived	at	a	similar	conclusion	regarding	equity	and	direct	foreign	investment;	his	research	
suggested	that	the	poor	quality	of	institutions	and	the	prevalence	of	corruption	inhibited	foreign	
investment.	 Somewhat	 to	 the	 contrary,	 Lucas	 (1990)	 dismisses	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 political	
risk	factor,	citing	the	example	of	India	prior	to	1945.	During	that	period,	India	was	still	subject	to	
British	rule	and,	consequently,	to	the	same	political	risk,	yet	its	capital	labor	ratio	remained	below	
that	of	Britain.
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In	line	with	the	results	on	broadly	defined	institutional	quality,	Reinhart	and	Rogoff	(2004)	focus	
on	serial	sovereign	default	and	its	effects	on	reputation	(which	may	be	considered	an	outcome	of	
poor	institutional	quality)	as	an	inhibitor	of	capital	inflows.	Table	1	below	shows	the	number	of	
defaults	(or	debt	restructurings)	during	the	20th	century	for	several	countries.	
The	importance	of	serial	default	led	Caselli	and	Feyrer	(2007)	to	suggest	that	in	order	to	keep	its	
creditworthiness	and	attract	foreign	savings,	a	country	with	a	past	default	history	should	maintain	
foreign	debt	at	a	maximum	ratio	of	30	percent	of	GDP,	and	that	this	ratio	should	be	prudently	
lowered	if	the	public	debt	is	too	high.	Table	2	shows	values	of	these	ratios	for	Brazil	and	Germany	
in	2012.
A	salient	conclusion	is	that	risk	(chiefly	stemming	from	weak	institutions	and	inadequate	policies)	
is	a	major	factor	influencing	net	capital	inflows.	Risk	evaluation	agencies	rate	sovereign	risk	for	
many	countries.	In	July	2013,	Standard	&	Poor’s	rated	Brazil	as	BBB/negative/A-2	and	Germany	
as	AAA/stable/A-1+.	Standard	&	Poor’s	March	2014	downgrade	of	Brazil	 to	BBB-	confirms	 this	
negative	tendency.	The	“negative”	and	“stable”	classifications	reflect	the	rating	agency’s	outlook	
regarding	further	rating	action.	Another	measure	of	the	overall	Brazilian	risk	is	the	interest	rate	
spread	between	Brazilian	debt	 and	US	Treasury	 securities,	known	as	EMBI	+.	Figure	1	 shows	
the	recent	evolution	of	this	difference.	It	fluctuates	considerably,	and	there	has	been	a	short-run	
upwards	trend	since	February	2013	(an	increase	of	100	basis	points	means	that	the	interest	rate	
difference	increased	one	percentage	point	per	year).	
Table 1: Number of defaults* during the 20th century, selected countries
Country Number of Defaults Episodes*
Ecuador, Uruguay and Liberia 6
Brazil and Peru 5
Venezuela, Austria and Yugoslavia 4
Mexico,Colombia, Argentina, Bulgaria, Russia and Poland 3
Germany, Chile and China 2
* Or debt restructuring
Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2004).
Table 2: Gross External Debt, Public Debt and GDP (2012)
Data Brazil Germany
Gross External Debt (as percent GDP) 19.6 168.2
Public Debt (as percent GDP) 58.8 81.9
GDP (US$ billion) 2252.7 3399.6
Source: World Bank, IMF and CIA.
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Figure 1: Brazilian risk as measured by EMBI + Risco Brasil
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The	 literature	 and	 evidence	 on	 international	 capital	 flows	 suggest	 that	 the	 typical	 Keynesian	
investment	theory	assertion,	that	decreasing	real	interest	rates	would	boost	investment,	is	perhaps	
too	simple.	Risk	(stemming	many	times	from	weak	or	weakening	institutions	or	inadequate	policies)	
and	shortage	of	human	capital	and	natural	resources	are	very	important	factors	as	well.	Regarding	
Brazil,	besides	the	current	shortage	of	qualified	workers	in	the	country	(a	factor	complementary	to	
capital),	the	policy	framework	coincided	with	a	generalized	perception	of	weakening	institutions	
and	inadequate	macroeconomic	policies,	as	reflected	in	the	recent	movement	shown	in	Figure	1.
2.  Direct Investment and Portfolio Investment from Abroad, in 
Brazil and in Germany
Foreign Direct Investment
Data	on	Brazil’s	and	Germany’s	stock	of	foreign	direct	investment	(FDI)	are	presented	in	Tables	
3,	4	and	5.
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Table 3: Direct Foreign Investment Position in Brazil, by country of origin, end of 2011
Rank Country US$ Billion
Total 688.6
1 Netherlands 171.2
2 United States 119.3
3 Spain 92.4
4 France 34.2
5 Japan 34.2
6 Luxembourg 32.7
7 United Kingdom 20.4
8 Mexico 17.1
9 Germany 16.7
10 Cayman Islands 16.5
Source: Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) – IMF.
Table 4: Direct Foreign Investment Position of Germany in other countries, end of 
2011
Rank Country US$ Billion
Total 1,206.3
1 United States 221.5
2 United Kingdom 126.5
3 Netherlands 113.5
4 Luxembourg 101.6
5 Belgium 55.3
6 France 52.5
7 China, P.R.: Mainland 44.2
8 Austria 43.0
9 Italy 42.0
10 Spain 33.9
17 Brazil 16.3
Source: Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) – IMF.
Table 5: Direct Foreign Investment Position in Germany, end of 2011
Rank Country US$ Billion
Total 915.3
1 Netherlands 229.3
2 Luxembourg 130.9
3 United States 91.4
4 France 83.4
5 Switzerland 79.1
6 United Kingdom 75.5
7 Italy 46.5
8 Austria 30.9
9 Japan 20.6
10 Sweden 19.7
161 Brazil 0.3
Source: Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) – IMF.
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Table	6	shows	the	stock	of	FDI	relative	to	GDP	of	the	world’s	20	largest	economies.	The	stock	of	
FDI	in	these	countries	corresponds	to	28.3	percent	of	their	combined	GDP,	while	their	stock	of	FDI	
abroad	corresponds	to	32.1	percent.	As	a	whole,	this	group	of	countries	received	and	sent	abroad	
about	the	same	amount	of	direct	investment.	Brazil	(and	other	emerging	markets	such	as	Mexico)	
received	FDI	in	line	with	the	overall	average,	but	they	sent	abroad	a	figure	quite	below	the	average.	
Germany	received	slightly	below	the	average	and	sent	abroad	a	sum	above	it.	 Japan,	India	and	
South	Korea	may	be	considered	relatively	closed	economies	in	terms	of	receiving	FDI.	
The	examination	of	Tables	3,	4,	5	and	6	allows	several	conclusions:
1)	 	The	total	stock	of	FDI	in	Brazil,	relative	to	GDP,	is	31	percent.	For	Germany,	the	figure	is	27	
percent.	The	figures	are	close	to	each	other,	suggesting,	as	argued	by	the	authors	mentioned	in	
the	previous	section,	that	emerging	economies	are	not	necessarily	preferred	recipients	of	FDI.	
Rather,	rich	countries	receive	a	sizable	portion	of	it.
	 	The	figures	 in	the	final	column	of	Table	6	are	a	measure	of	the	openness	of	each	economy	
with	respect	to	FDI.	 It	 is	an	important	measure,	since	the	stock	of	FDI	is	accumulated	over	
Table 6: Stock of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) as percent of GDP (for the 20 
largest GDP countries)
RANK (based 
on GDP)
Country 1. Stock of FDI in the country 
as percent of GDP
2. Stock of FDI of the country 
abroad as percent of GDP
1 + 2
1 United States 16.2 26.5 42.7
2 China 23.2 0.0 23.2
3 Japan 3.8 16.2 19.9
4 Germany 26.9 35.5 62.4
5 France 37.2 61.1 98.4
6 United Kingdom 43.7 70.8 114.5
7 Brazil 30.6 6.8 37.4
8 Russian Federation 22.6 18.0 40.6
9 Italy 16.9 25.8 42.7
10 India 9.7 3.3 13.0
11 Canada 32.2 36.3 68.5
12 Australia 33.9 22.6 56.5
13 Spain 43.8 44.9 88.7
14 Mexico 29.8 8.4 38.2
15 Korea, Rep. 11.8 15.2 27.0
16 Indonesia 21.2 0.0 21.2
17 Turkey 14.4 3.3 17.7
18 Netherlands 443.1 550.8 993.9
19 Switzerland 102.0 162.9 264.9
20 Sweden 64.7 67.2 131.9
OVERALL 28.3 32.1 
Source: Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) – IMF.
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many	years.	Consequently,	it	reflects	information	regarding	the	long-run	historical	behavior	
of	the	country	with	respect	to	FDI—i.e.,	information	about	its	economic	relationship	with	other	
countries	and,	particularly,	its	absorption	of	foreign	capital	and	technology.	
	 	The	 coefficient	 of	 correlation	 between	 the	measure	 of	 openness	 described	 in	 Table	 6	 (last	
column)—and	 a	more	 traditional	measure	 of	 openness,	 such	 as	 (import	 +	 exports)/GDP—is	
0.368.	And	a	“Student	t”	statistical	test	shows	that	the	correlation	is	significantly	different	from	
zero	at	the	95	percent	confidence	level.	The	conclusion	is	that	countries	that	are	open	to	trade	
tend	to	be	open	to	FDI	(and	vice	versa).
	 	According	to	the	FDI	openness	criteria,	as	a	recipient	country	Brazil	ranks	ninth	among	the	20	
largest	economies.	Germany	ranks	11th.
2)	 	Assuming	an	income/capital	ratio	of	20	percent,	the	total	capital	stock	in	Brazil	would	have	a	
value	of	US$11.3	trillion.	Consequently,	considering	Table	3,	the	value	of	the	stock	of	foreign	
direct	investment	in	Brazil	would	be	about	six	percent	of	the	value	of	the	total	capital	stock	in	
the	country.	If	the	income/capital	ratio	were	25	percent,	the	percentage	of	the	stock	of	foreign	
direct	investment	in	Brazil	would	be	around	7.5	percent	of	the	total	stock	of	capital.
	 	For	Germany,	 the	ratios	 for	each	hypothesis	would	be	slightly	smaller:	5.5	percent	and	6.9	
percent,	respectively.	Consequently,	there	is	not	much	difference	between	a	high-income-per-
capita	country	such	as	Germany	and	a	medium-income-per-capita	country	such	as	Brazil.	The	
overall	 figures	 (see	 the	 last	 line	of	Table	6)	 also	 suggest	 that,	making	similar	assumptions	
about	the	income/capital	ratio	for	all	the	20	countries,	the	percentage	of	the	stock	of	foreign	
direct	 investment	 to	 the	 total	 capital	 stock,	 for	 an	 average	 country	 of	 the	 group,	would	 be	
around	six	or	seven	percent.
3)	 	The	 stock	 of	 German	 direct	 investment	 in	 Brazil	 is	 1.4	 percent	 of	 the	 total	 German	 direct	
investment	abroad.	Through	the	years,	it	has	been	the	US—a	developed	country—that	has	been	
the	principal	recipient	of	German	direct	 investment	(18.4	percent	of	 the	total,	 representing	
US$	119	billion);	data	from	the	same	source	show	that	the	US	owns	10	percent	(worth	US$	91.4	
billion)	of	the	stock	of	FDI	in	Germany.	Brazil,	with	US$260	million	of	total	direct	investment	
in	Germany,	is	the	globe’s	161st	foreign	direct	investor	in	Germany.	Given	that	the	total	stock	
of	Brazilian	direct	investment	abroad	is	worth	US$154	billion,	Brazilian	direct	investment	in	
the	capital	stock	in	Germany	is	quite	small.
4)	 	Table	7	(derived	from	the	previous	tables)	shows	the	percentage	distribution	of	FDI	in	Brazil,	
by	country	of	origin.
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The	stock	of	direct	investment	of	Germany	in	Brazil	amounts	to	2.4	percent	of	the	total,	and	ranks	
ninth,	behind	the	Netherlands,	the	US	and	Spain	(see	the	footnote	on	p.	4	for	an	explanation	of	
the	Dutch	figure).
Foreign Portfolio Investment
Figures	on	the	total	stock	of	foreign	portfolio	investments	in	Brazil—and	its	distribution	by	country—
appear	in	Table	8.	Total	portfolio	investment	remains	less	than	the	total	value	of	FDI	in	the	country.	
Germany	is	responsible	for	one	percent	of	this	portfolio	investment,	far	behind	the	US,	the	largest	
investor	with	39	percent	of	the	total.	(The	over-representation	of	countries	such	as	Luxembourg	
and	the	Cayman	Islands	likely	reflects	those	countries’	status	as	tax	havens.)
Table 7: Distribution of the stock of foreign direct investment in Brazil, by country 
of origin, end of 2011
Rank Country Percent
1 Netherlands 24.8
2 USA 17.3
3 Spain 13.4
4 France 5.0
5 Japan 5.0
6 Luxembourg 4.8
7 UK 3.0
8 Mexico 2.5
9 Germany 2.4
Source: Author’s Calculations based on CDIS/IMF Data
Table 8: Portfolio Investment Liabilities of Brazil to other countries, end of 2011
Rank Country US$ Billion
Total 497.1
1 United States 196.2
2 United Kingdom 106.0
3 Luxembourg 53.0
4 Japan 28.9
5 Cayman Islands 17.4
6 Netherlands 11.8
7 Canada 11.7
8 Ireland 11.7
9 Norway 7.9
10 France 7.8
11 Germany 5.0
Source: Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) – IMF.
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Table	9	shows	German	portfolio	investments	in	other	countries	(which	total	about	twice	the	amount	
of	German	direct	investments	abroad).	Luxembourg	is	the	No.	1	recipient,	while	Brazil	accounts	
for	only	0.2	percent	of	the	total.
Table	10	makes	a	comparison	of	the	Brazilian	and	the	German	stock	positions	of	foreign	direct	
investments	and	portfolio	investments,	as	recipient	and	investor	countries.	Again,	German	portfolio	
investment	in	Luxembourg	is	significantly	overstated	as	the	funds	do	not	stay	in	Luxembourg,	but	
are	only	routed	through	the	country.	
Table	10	shows	that,	overall,	Brazil	receives	far	more	portfolio	inflow	than	it	invests	abroad.	While	
Germany	does	invest	heavily	abroad,	it	is	still	a	net	recipient	of	portfolio	investment.
Table 9: Portfolio Investment Assets of Germany in other countries, end of 2011
Rank Country US$ Billion
Total 2,380.4
1 Luxembourg 301.5
2 France 237.3
3 Netherlands 202.5
4 United States 202.2
5 United Kingdom 173.7
6 Italy 163.7
7 Spain 125.3
8 Ireland 92.0
9 Austria 53.8
28 Brazil 5.0
Source: Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) – IMF.
Table 10: Stock of Foreign Direct and Portfolio Investment; Brazil and Germany 
as recipient and investor countries, end of 2011
Brazil Percent of GDP Germany Percent of GDP
Recipient Investor Recipient Investor
Foreign Direct Investment 30.6 6.8 26.9 35.5
Portfolio Investment 22.1 1.3 82.9 70.0
Source: CPIS/IMF and CDIS/IMF
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3. The Macroeconomics of International Financial Flows
By	sharply	decreasing	costs	of	communication	and	transportation,	and	the	general	globalization	
process	has	led	to	an	extraordinary	expansion	of	trade	and	of	capital	flows	of	all	kinds.	Figures	2	
and	3	show	the	evolution	of	FDI	in	the	world	and	the	evolution	of	foreign	trade	for	the	Brazilian	
and	German	economies,	respectively.
The	figures	reveal	the	clear	expansion	in	trade	and	capital	flows	(FDI):
Figure 3: (Imports + Exports) as percent of GDP, Brazil and Germany
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Net	 recipients	of	 financial	 flows	may	 run	current	account	deficits	 (i.e.,	 they	may	 receive	a	net	
positive	excess	value	of	goods	and	services	from	abroad,	allowing	them	to	sustain	a	higher	level	
of	investment	and,	consequently,	obtain	a	higher	potential	GDP	growth	rate).	Countries	that	are	
suppliers	of	savings	run	current	account	surpluses,	transferring	abroad	goods	and	services	now	
and	expecting	to	receive	future	repayments	of	goods	and	services	(see	Obstfeld	and	Rogoff,	1996).	
Figure	4	shows	 that,	during	 the	past	20	years,	Brazil	has	absorbed	more	 foreign	savings	 than	
Germany:	Germany	has	been	an	exporter	of	savings	since	2000,	and	particularly	in	the	last	five	
years,	the	German	current	account	was	in	considerable	surplus	while	Brazil’s	was	in	deficit.	
For	its	part,	Brazil	needs	foreign	savings	to	increase	its	relatively	low	fixed	investment/GDP	ratio,	
which	oscillated	around	17	to	18	percent,	well	above	the	low	level	of	domestic	savings	(14	to	15	
percent	of	GDP).	Table	11,	below,	shows	the	total	fixed	investment	in	Brazil	as	a	percent	of	GDP.	
The	ratio	has	been	somewhat	below	20	percent	during	 the	 first	decade	of	 the	current	century.	
By	comparison,	in	China	it	has	been	around	50	percent.	The	Brazilian	investment	to	GDP	ratio	is	
two	to	five	percentage	points	lower	than	the	same	rate	in	several	other	Latin	American	countries,	
including	Chile,	Argentina,	Peru,	Colombia	and	Mexico.
Figure 4: Current Account Balance as percent of GDP; Germany and Brazil.
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International	financial	flows	are	the	crucial	transmission	mechanism	of	savings	among	countries.	
These	 flows	 finance	 current	 account	 deficits.	 Yet	 the	 recent	 and	 substantial	 expansion	 of	
international	capital	flows	between	countries	and	currencies	has	raised	the	question	of	whether	
these	flows	are	a	threat	to	macroeconomic	stability.	The	fear	is	that	a	sharp,	possibly	unwarranted,	
redirection	of	these	flows	could	overstate	both	the	upside	and	downside	of	a	country’s	economic	
conditions.
Thus,	the	key	question	is	whether	the	free	flow	of	capital	is	on	the	whole	more	of	a	benefit	for	the	
countries	involved	than	it	is	a	detraction.	To	answer	that	question,	we	turn	to	Professor	Jagdish	
Bhagwati	 and	 his	well-known	 article	 entitled	 “The	 Capital	Myth”	 (1998).	 Bhagwati	 favors	 free	
trade	in	goods	and	services,	but	he	argues	that	totally	liberalized	capital	movements—that	is	to	
say,	capital	of	any	sort	and	of	any	amount—have	disadvantages	that	are	not	present	in	the	case	of	
free	trade.
The	 problem	 inherent	 to	 portfolio	 capital	 flows	 is	 that	 they	 are	 subject	 to	 contagion	 and	herd	
behavior,	which	is	at	times	driven	by	panics,	manias	and	crashes.	Destabilizing	speculators,	defined	
as	those	who	bet	against	a	given	country’s	economic	fundamentals,	may	realize	huge	profits	as	the	
speculative	behavior	itself	changes	the	fundamentals.	Economic	models	with	speculative	behavior	
have	different	equilibrium	positions.	Consequently,	the	well-known	argument	of	Milton	Friedman	
(1953),	that	destabilizing	speculation	would	eventually	punish	the	speculators	with	losses	once	
the	underlying	fundamentals	reassert	themselves,	 is	theoretically	incorrect.	Speculation	simply	
changes	the	fundamentals	in	models	with	speculation.	Researchers	such	as	Triffin	(1957),	Aliber	
(1962),	Obstfeld	(1986)	and	others	have	shown	this	while	also	raising	the	possibility	of	multiple	
economic	equilibria.	Moreover,	free	capital	flows	in	the	presence	of	trade	distortions	(tariffs,	quotas,	
etc.)	may	not	be	a	second-best	solution,	according	to	arguments	developed	by	Cooper	(1998,	1999).
Not	all	forms	of	investment	cause	these	kinds	of	risks.	In	fact,	the	major	gains	from	capital	flows	
to	developing	countries	(including	the	acquisition	of	skills	and	technology)	may	be	obtained	by	
Table 11: Fixed Investment as percent of GDP in Brazil
Year Fixed Investment
2000 16.8
2001 17.0
2002 16.4
2003 15.3
2004 16.1
2005 15.9
2006 16.4
2007 17.4
2008 18.7
2009 16.7
2010 18.4
Source: IpeaData
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encouraging	 direct	 foreign	 investment.	 This	 would	 imply	 that	 a	 successful	 policy	 grants	 free	
exchange	convertibility	only	 to	 firms’	earnings	and	capital.	Banks,	 firms	and	common	citizens	
should	not	have	 the	ability	 to	 freely	withdraw	short-term	capital	 from	the	country	 in	whatever	
magnitude	they	like.	Neither	should	they	be	able	to	make	short-term	loans,	which	can	increase	
sharply	 in	 the	 presence	 of	 unsustainable	 asset	 price	movements	 and	 can	 reinforce	 economic	
instability.
The	 case	 of	 Brazil	 presents	 an	 illuminating	 example	 of	 instabilities	 related	 to	 capital	 inflows.	
In	 particular,	 in	Brazil	we	 find	 interesting	 results	when	 these	 flows	 interact	with	 the	political	
system,	making	for	an	excellent	political	economy	case	study.	Capital	flow	volatility	has	been	an	
important	factor	behind	the	increased	volatility	of	the	domestic	exchange	rate	for	the	past	decade.	
For	example,	the	shock	stemming	from	the	September	2008	global	crisis	(seen	in	Figure	5),	acting	
through	 the	 flight	 of	 portfolio	 investments	 to	 other	 countries,	 was	 followed	 by	 an	 increase	 of	
roughly	50	percent	in	the	market	exchange	rate	of	the	Brazilian	real	to	the	US	dollar	in	less	than	
a	month.	Beyond	inflationary	pressure,	this	currency	movement	caused	problems	for	companies	
and	banks	with	dollar	liabilities,	with	several	such	firms	ending	up	going	bankrupt.	Later	in	the	
same	year,	when	the	extent	of	the	crisis	became	clearer	(and	the	relatively	solid	financial	position	
of	Brazil	became	well-known),	the	exchange	rate	of	the	real	to	the	dollar	returned	to	its	previous	
level.
Capital	inflows	were	attracted	by	the	high	interest	rates	in	Brazil	(these	high	rates	were	a	holdover	
from	 the	1990s,	when	Brazil	 faced	extremely	high	domestic	 rates	of	 inflation).	Figure	7	below	
shows	the	evolution	of	the	money	market	interest	rate	in	Brazil,	while	Figure	6	shows	the	end-of-
the-year	exchange	rates.
Figure 5: Portfolio Investment Liabilities of Brazil to other countries. Stock of 
Equity Securities from 2001–2011, reported by Brazil
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The	 substantial	 appreciation	 of	 the	 real	 in	 this	 period	 caused	 problems	 for	 the	 export	 sector.	
Moreover,	 the	 average	Brazilian	 rate	 of	 inflation	 in	 the	 same	period	was	greater	 than	 the	 rate	
of	 inflation	of	Brazil’s	more	 important	 trading	partners.	Brazilian	 rates	of	 inflation	 reached	an	
average	of	 just	under	 six	percent	 in	2003–2013,	 consistently	 reaching	 the	ceiling	of	monetary	
policy	targets	and	far	surpassing	rates	in	trade	partner	countries	such	as	Germany	(1.82	percent	
in	that	period)	and	the	US	(2.40	percent).	Brazilian	industrial	exports	took	a	serious	hit	from	the	
combination	of	nominal	exchange	appreciation	and	higher	 inflation,	as	 it	 implied	a	significant	
appreciation	of	the	real.	
The	Brazilian	government	reacted	to	the	appreciation	of	the	real	by	buying	foreign	currency	in	
the	exchange	markets	in	order	to	avoid	devaluation.	As	a	result	the	international	reserves	of	the	
Source: IPEAdata.
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Figure 7: Brazil Money Market Interest Rate (SELIC), 2003–2012 
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country	increased	substantially,	from	US$49	billion	to	US$373	billion,	over	the	period	2003–2013.	
Yet	the	acquisition	of	international	reserves	could	not	prevent	an	appreciation	and	was	also	costly	
to	the	government	in	terms	of	its	domestic	public	debt	and	interest.	The	foreign	currency	reserves,	
when	invested	in	international	banks,	did	not	receive	comparable	interest	payments.	Additionally,	
since	 the	 foreign	 currency	 continued	 to	 devalue	 relative	 to	 the	 real,	 the	Brazilian	 government	
suffered	huge	exchange	losses	on	its	holdings	of	foreign	currency	reserves	(it	is	difficult	to	assess	
precisely	how	much,	but	such	losses	are	likely	to	have	exceeded	100	billion	reais).
As	the	real	continued	to	appreciate	in	real	terms,	Brazilian	industrial	exports	became	increasingly	
uncompetitive.	Commodity	exporters	were	 compensated	by	abnormally	high	commodity	prices	
(see	Figure	8),	but	the	same	did	not	happen	to	industrial	exporters	(see	Figure	9).	
	
Source: IPEAdata.
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Figure 9: Industrial Exports ÷ Total Industrial Production  
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The	fiscal	costs	of	the	international	reserves	and	the	continuous	appreciation	of	the	real	finally	led	
to	a	2012	government	policy	of	sharply	cutting	domestic	interest	rates	to	avoid	attracting	foreign	
financial	capital,	devaluing	the	real,	and	boosting	industrial	exports	and	investments.	The	concern	
with	 this	approach,	however,	 is	 that	 lower	domestic	 interest	rates	may	fuel	 increased	 inflation,	
preventing	the	desired	depreciation	of	the	exchange	rate.	
To	avoid	the	resurgence	of	inflation,	the	Brazilian	government	intervened	to	curb	energy	prices	
(oil	and	electricity)	and	postponed	other	price	increases	(in	public	transportation,	for	instance).	
Besides	these	actions,	the	government	began	engaging	in	what	was	termed	“creative	accounting”	
(manipulating	the	public-sector	budget	results	and	using	nonstandard	practices	such	as	deferring	
spending)	in	order	to	stay	within	the	original	budget	surplus	target	zone.	This	demonstrates	that	
huge	international	reserves	do	have	a	price,	in	terms	of	lower	budget	surplus	or	deficits.
These	interventionist	policies	and	the	diminished	commitment	of	the	central	bank	to	strict	inflation	
targets	have	caused	increased	uncertainty	for	investors	in	the	Brazilian	economy:	Investment	in	
2012	declined	four	percent	relative	to	2011.	
In	 conclusion,	 allowing	 free	 international	 capital	 flows	 set	 a	 chain	 of	 events	 in	motion	which,	
paradoxically,	 led	 to	 a	 decrease	 of	 investment	 and	 of	 the	 productive	 capacity	 growth	 of	 the	
Brazilian	 economy.	 Speculative	 capital	 flows	 have	 been	 particularly	 problematic	 for	 Brazilian	
policymakers.	 Such	 flows	 are	 also	 caused,	 however,	 by	 the	 substantial	 difference	 of	 economic	
policies	among	interacting	countries.	Their	interaction	leads	to	a	mutual	influence	that	should	be	
taken	into	account	by	policymakers	in	each	of	the	countries.	In	fact,	the	lack	of	policy	coordination	
may	cause	an	overall	sub-optimum	decision-making	process,	typical	of	non-cooperative	games.
If	there	is	zero	policy	coordination,	then	controls	on	short-run	financial	flows	may	be	necessary	
for	 a	 country	 to	 defend	 itself	 against	 the	 eventual	 negative	 externalities	 coming	 from	 abroad.	
Conversely,	if	there	is	enough	policy	coordination,	then	a	lack	of	capital	controls	may	be	compatible	
with	stability	and	growth.	If	the	major	economies	of	the	world	adopt	macro	policies	that	treat	their	
emerging	partners	as	passive	adapters,	the	political	economy	and	the	policymaking	process	may	
make	capital	controls	desirable	for	poor	and	emerging	economies.	
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German-Brazilian	 economic	 relations	may	 be	 growing,	 but	 they	 remain	 far	 from	 their	 overall	
potential.	In	some	cases,	differing	policy	approaches	prevent	both	countries	from	fully	exercising	
their	 comparative	 advantages	 or	 engaging	 in	 mutually	 beneficial	 exchanges.	 In	 other	 cases,	
membership	in	political	and	economic	blocs	constrains	both	countries’	abilities	to	expand	their	
economic	relations	where	it	is	in	the	national	interest.	
Given	 the	 deep-seated	 and	 often	 political	 nature	 of	 these	 obstacles,	 concrete	 and	 actionable	
recommendations	 can	 be	 elusive.	 Nevertheless,	 this	 paper	 indicates	 that	 there	 is	 significant	
common	ground	shared	between	Brazil	and	Germany,	and	there	are	concrete	recommendations	
that	can	help	both	countries	build	upon	this	common	ground.	
These	 recommendations	 aim	 to	 deepen	 those	 economic	 relations	 which	 are	 less	 exposed	 to	
sovereign	policy	risks	and	that	hinge	more	on	the	knowledge	and	the	agency	of	major	economic	
actors.	At	the	same	time,	the	recommendations	do	not	shy	away	from	the	difficult	yet	important	
policy	debates	that	remain.	Instead	of	attempting	to	define	correct	or	incorrect	policies,	we	seek	
strategies	to	make	differing	policies	mutually	compatible.	
	
In	particular,	 this	section	offers	recommendations	for	1)fostering	bilateral	direct	 investment;	2)
harmonizing	monetary	 policy,	 3)facilitating	migration	 as	 a	 mechanism	 for	 spurring	 economic	
links,	4)finding	common	ground	on	trade	policy,	and	5)encouraging	Brazil	and	Germany	to	assume	
leadership	roles	in	advancing	an	EU-Mercosul	FTA.	
1. Prioritizing Bilateral Direct Investment
While	a	firm	consensus	can	be	hard	to	find	on	whether	open	capital	flows	benefit	a	given	economy,	
there	 is	 greater	 room	 for	 agreement	 on	FDI.	Moreover,	 in	 contrast	 to	 liberalizing	 trade,	which	
requires	 a	 time-consuming	 and	 cumbersome	negotiation	process,	 a	 deepening	 of	 bilateral	 FDI	
can	be	achieved	on	a	project-by-project	basis.	Thus,	FDI	is	a	fertile	topic	for	further	analysis	and	
debate	because	it	is	relatively	resilient	to	political	processes.	Additionally,	given	the	link	between	
FDI	and	international	trade,	especially	as	it	pertains	to	“new	trade	issues”	(intra-industry	trade,	
supply	chain	integration,	intellectual	property	rights),	openness	to	FDI	should	support	increased	
trade	openness	(share	of	exports	and	imports	in	the	economy).	
One	key	opportunity	 is	 for	German	companies	 to	build	 industrial	 plants	 in	Brazil,	 thus	 taking	
advantage	of	the	still-growing	Brazilian	consumer	market	that	is	ready	for	products	that	make	use	
of	“German	engineering”	but	that	could	be	produced	locally	in	mass	quantities.	
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Likewise,	Brazilian	R&D	teams—whose	projects	may	never	come	to	fruition	given	constraints	in	
Brazil’s	skilled-labor	market—might	benefit	from	basing	their	operations	in	Germany.	Medium	and	
long-term	opportunities	for	local	(German,	Brazilian)	industries	might	also	be	created	by	generating	
complementary	industries	abroad	(Brazil,	Germany),	either	from	the	fragmentation	of	industrial	
processes	or	from	more	complex	scenarios	such	as	brand	effects	and	network	externalities.
Yet	these	linkages	do	not	always	emerge	organically.	Both	Brazil	and	Germany	can	take	steps	to	
encourage	bilateral	FDI,	by	drawing	attention	to	the	opportunities	in	both	countries.	In	order	to	
expand	direct	investment	between	Brazil	and	Germany,	we	suggest	that	both	countries	promote	
partial	or	full	exemption	on	corporate	taxes	and	import	duties	between	them.	We	also	call	for	the	
bilateral	investment	treaty	signed	by	Brazil	and	Germany	in	1995	to	be	ratified,	as	it	would	provide	
investors	with	confidence	that	their	rights	will	be	protected.	
There	is	also	the	potential	of	fruitful	collaborations	emerging	between	similar	institutions,	such	
as	 the	 Brazilian	 development	 bank	 (Banco	 Nacional	 do	 Desenvolvimento	 Econômico	 e	 Social,	
or	 BNDES)	 and	 the	 German	 development	 bank	 (KfW	 Entwicklungsbank).	 In	 particular,	 these	
organizations	might	work	together	to	facilitate	German	investment	in	Brazilian	infrastructure—an	
area	where	we	see	urgent	demand	on	the	Brazilian	side	and	particular	expertise	on	the	German	
side.
Finally,	an	annual	conference	featuring	 investors	and	policymakers	could	 facilitate	connections	
while	also	offering	a	forum	to	harmonize	regulatory	and	legal	standards.	Initially,	such	a	conference	
could	address	fundamental	questions	such	as	why	German	investment	in	Brazil	(measured	as	a	
percentage	 of	GDP)	 significantly	 lags	 that	 of	 other	 countries	 including	 the	US	and	Spain.	 The	
German-Brazilian	Business	Day,	organized	annually	by	the	Federation	of	German	Industries	(BDI)	
and	 its	Brazilian	counterpart,	 the	National	Confederation	of	 Industry	 (CNI),	could	be	expanded	
into	 a	 broader	 conference	 bringing	 together	 the	 business	 community	 with	 policymakers	 and	
academics.	
2. Harmonizing Monetary Policy
In	order	to	fully	leverage	the	potential	of	bilateral	German-Brazilian	investment,	the	two	countries	
must	reconcile	their	differing	perspectives	on	capital	controls.	
In	general,	Germany	supports	free	capital	markets	and	rejects	capital	controls.	Germany	welcomes	
inward	FDI	because	such	investments	provide	new	jobs.	An	interest	in	outward	FDI	stems	from	
a	 desire	 for	 improved	 access	 to	 foreign	 markets.	 Given	 its	 export	 surpluses,	 Germany	 seeks	
investment	opportunities	abroad—both	in	terms	of	FDI	and	portfolio	investment.	In	contrast	with	
emerging	markets,	Germany	does	not	need	high	foreign	currency	reserves	to	prevent	depreciations	
of	its	own	currency.	Also	differing	from	developing	economies,	the	German	capital	stock	is	already	
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relatively	 large.	 Hence	 the	 demand	 for	 domestic	 investment	 is	 comparatively	 small.	 Surplus	
revenue	from	foreign	trade	 is	spent	on	 investment	abroad	rather	 than	on	currency	reserves	or	
domestic	investments.	Therefore,	Germany	supports	very	open	FDI	and	portfolio	investment	policy.
Brazil,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 has	 suffered	 exchange	 rate	 volatility	 in	 recent	 years	 that	 has	 gone	
beyond	what	would	be	expected	based	on	 the	underlying	uncertainty	about	 the	 real	 economy.	
Some	Brazilian	policymakers	have	argued	that	sharp	variations	of	short-run	capital	movements	
may	be	caused	by	the	lack	of	harmonization	in	international	macroeconomic	policies,	as	evidenced	
recently	by	emerging	market	turbulence	caused	by	tightening	monetary	policy	in	the	US.	While	
US	 monetary	 policy	 is	 made	 exclusively	 with	 US	 economic	 interests	 in	 mind,	 it	 has	 global	
implications	because	 the	dollar	 is	effectively	a	global	currency.	For	similar	 reasons,	Brazil	and	
Germany	should	 strive	 to	maintain	global	macroeconomic	 stability,	which	may	 imply	a	greater	
degree	of	macroeconomic	policy	harmonization	and	coordination.
The	Chilean	model	of	capital	control	is	a	possible	model	for	a	medium	ground	compatible	with	the	
interests	of	both	countries.	Between	1991	and	1998,	the	Central	Bank	of	Chile	enacted	the	encaje,	
which	required	a	fraction	of	the	capital	 inflow	to	be	deposited	at	the	central	bank	for	a	certain	
period	of	time	(typically	a	year),	and	without	remuneration	(unremunerated	reserve	requirement,	
or	URR).	 The	 encaje	was	modified	 a	number	 of	 times	 as	policymakers	 sought	 to	 establish	 the	
correct	balance.	Alternatively,	foreign	investors	could	pay	an	upfront	fee	to	the	central	bank	and	
avoid	 the	URR.	Studies	have	 suggested	 that	 the	 encaje	 succeeded	 in	 changing	 the	maturity	 of	
capital	 inflows,	 allowing	 the	 government	more	 room	 for	 independent	monetary	 policy.	 Such	 a	
middle	ground	can	be	predictable	enough	for	foreign	investors.	At	the	same	time,	phenomena	such	
as	adverse	selection	in	favor	of	speculative	capital	can	be	avoided	by	eschewing	interest	rates	as	
primary	means	of	stabilizing	capital	flows.	Ultimately,	stability	benefits	all.
While	some	restrictions	on	 the	 flow	of	“hot	money”	 (short-term	portfolio	 investment)	might	be	
warranted	in	Brazil,	direct	investment	should	be	welcomed.	Brazil	has	been	quite	successful	at	
attracting	 FDI,	mostly	 because	 of	 the	 attractiveness	 of	 its	 domestic	market	 and	 abundance	 of	
natural	resources.	However,	this	market	and	resource	seeking	investment,	while	welcome,	does	
not	present	the	many	opportunities	 in	terms	of	technology	transfer	and	increased	productivity.	
Therefore	investment	in	other	areas	such	as	manufacturing	and	professional	services	should	be	
encouraged.	To	attract	this	kind	of	investment	however,	Brazil	might	need	to	become	more	open	in	
areas	such	as	trade	and	immigration	which	are	necessary	for	production	in	these	sectors.	
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3. Towards an Understanding on Migration
Demography,	migration	and	labor	can	play	a	key	role	in	the	deepening	of	bilateral	direct	investment	
between	Brazil	and	Germany.	For	example,	Brazil	faces	deficits	in	the	qualification	of	industrial	
workers.	In	contrast,	Germany	is	likely	to	suffer	from	labor	shortages	due	to	demographic	changes,	
despite	being	the	home	to	the	third-highest	number	of	international	migrants,	according	to	the	
UN,	of	which	only	about	a	third	come	from	the	European	Union.	
In	this	context,	Brazil	and	Germany	should	consider	working	on	a	mutually	beneficial	understanding	
on	migration.	The	destination	of	FDI	is	often	linked	to	the	movement	of	people.	The	key	condition	for	
feasibility	of	an	investment	project	is	the	internalized,	often	tacit	knowledge	of	the	chief	investors	
and	key	specialists,	which	cannot	be	exported	when	building	a	business	elsewhere.	The	feasibility	
of	industrial	processes	may	also	hinge	on	specific	qualifications	that	cannot	be	transferred	easily,	
and	may	necessitate	bringing	along	a	more	significant	 labor	 force.	 In	addition,	migration	rules	
play	an	important	rule	for	tradable	services,	especially	terms	of	temporary	movement	of	persons.	
Seizing	 the	opportunity	of	extending	bilateral	 trade	 in	services	 therefore	would	benefit	 from	a	
more	open	migration	regime.	
Such	realities	are	not	always	obvious	to	policymakers	who	deal	with	 the	political	 land	mine	of	
migration.	As	Europe	is	mired	in	an	economic	slump,	some	of	its	citizens	are	increasingly	wary	
of	expanding	non-European	immigration	into	continental	Europe.	From	the	Brazilian	perspective,	
the	country	is	concerned	about	losing	too	many	of	its	highly	educated	specialists	(the	so	called	
“brain	drain”	effect).	Also	labor	unions	and	associations	of	professionals	in	Brazil	(e.g.,	medical	
associations)	tend	to	oppose	opening	their	professions	to	immigrants,	and	they	can	constitute	a	
significant	and	organized	special	interest.	
Thus,	 an	 agreement	 on	migration	 that	 suits	 the	 deepening	 of	 bilateral	 investment	 should	 not	
be	left	to	the	extant	political	process,	but	understood	as	something	that	arises	from	the	goals	of	
investors	and	other	economic	agents	involved	in	FDI	projects	in	either	country.
On	a	related	(and	perhaps	less	contentious)	note,	we	recommend	the	promotion	of	cross-cultural	
exchange	programs.	Brazil	 remains	an	exotic	and	poorly	understood	destination	 in	 the	eyes	of	
many	Germans,	 and	 the	 same	 is	 true	 for	Germany	 as	 seen	 by	Brazilians.	As	 a	 result,	 foreign	
investment	projects	between	the	two	can	seem	daunting.	However,	stemming	from	the	German	
ethnic	 origins	 of	 a	 sizable	 portion	 of	 Brazil’s	 population,	 the	 southern	Brazilian	 states	 (where	
people	of	German	descent	are	concentrated)	have	interesting	relations	with	several	segments	of	
German	society,	 including	 twin	and	 sister	 cities	 agreements,	 cross-collaborations	among	small	
and	medium	enterprises,	technology	exchanges	between	scientific	and	industrial	research	centers,	
and	art	and	cultural	festivals.	We	believe	that	an	expansion	of	such	cross-cultural	programs,	such	
as	 study	 abroad	 opportunities	 at	 the	 high	 school	 and	 university	 levels,	 could	 pay	 significant	
dividends	down	the	road.	Similarly,	tourism	is	an	area	that	could	be	expanded	in	both	directions.	
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4. Finding Common Ground on Trade Policy
Our	 first	 recommendations	 focus	 on	 FDI	 because	 we	 believe	 these	 will	 be	 easier	 to	 achieve.	
However,	 given	 the	 complementary	 export	 portfolios	 and	 potential	 for	 mutually	 beneficial	
integration	 between	 the	 two	 countries,	 neither	 should	 shy	 away	 from	 the	 difficult	 dialogues	
required	to	deepen	trade	in	goods	and	services.
We	stress	 that	 foreign	 trade	has	a	positive	 impact	on	 the	economic	development	of	Brazil	and	
Germany.	Broadly	speaking,	the	key	policy	here	is	that	both	countries	should	expand	liberalization	
and	reduce	existing	tariff	and	non-tariff	trade	restrictions,	especially	those	most	relevant	for	the	
Brazilian-German	trade	relationship.	As	said,	outside	the	framework	of	an	EU-Mercosul	FTA,	there	
is	still	much	that	can	be	done.	
The	 European	 Union	 consistently	 maintains	 high	 taxes	 and	 non-tariff	 barriers	 on	 agricultural	
products,	which	play	an	important	role	for	Brazilian	exports.	Germany	should	plead	for	a	reduction	
of	such	barriers	at	the	European	level.	Furthermore,	Germany	could	push	for	changes	in	the	EU’s	
Common	Agricultural	 Policy	 to	 reduce—or	 even	 abolish—subsidies	 for	 agriculture;	 a	 distortion	 of	
competition	at	the	expense	of	developing	and	emerging	countries	such	as	Brazil.	In	exchange,	Brazil	
should	reduce	its	taxes	on	final	industrial	goods.	Such	measures	would	be	beneficial	for	both	sides.
A	 liberalization	 of	 trade	 flows	 should	 also	 facilitate	 the	 establishment	 of	 international	 supply	
chains	linking	industries	in	Germany	and	Brazil.	Given	that	both	countries	are	the	most	prominent	
manufacturing	 hubs	 in	 their	 respective	 regions,	 there	 should	 be	 significant	 gains	made	 from	
supply	chain	integration.	
Another	aspect	 is	 that	contemporary	ways	of	production	and	consumption	are	not	sustainable,	
especially	 due	 to	 the	 implied	 huge	 demand	 for	 natural	 resources	 and	 the	 volume	 of	 harmful	
emissions.	 In	 order	 to	move	 to	more	 sustainable	 patterns,	 an	 increase	 in	 the	 price	 of	 natural	
resources	and	carbon	seems	unavoidable.	However,	if	a	single	economy	takes	a	step	to	reduce	the	
domestic	demand	for	natural	resources,	at	least	in	the	short	run	this	decision	will	have	a	negative	
impact	on	its	international	competitiveness,	as	production	costs	would	likely	increase.	
How	could	Brazil	and	Germany	reduce	their	demand	and	consumption	of	natural	resources	without	
losing	international	competitiveness	and	increasing	unemployment?	How	can	Brazil	and	Germany	
maintain	their	export	capability	and	simultaneously	promote	environmental	sustainability?	Can	
an	increase	in	services	output	and	exports	combine	ecological	sustainability	with	international	
competitiveness?	
One	answer	could	be	for	Brazil	and	Germany	to	cooperate	in	the	development	and	dissemination	of	
green	technologies.	Both	countries	have	expertise	in	different	forms	of	renewable	energy.	Instead	
of	protecting	their	domestic	industries,	the	countries	should	aim	at	learning	from	each	other	and	
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welcoming	 imports	 of	 products	 related	 to	 renewable	 energy.	 This	 includes	 allowing	 exports	 of	
sugarcane-based	ethanol	from	Brazil	to	Europe.	
These	are	crucial	questions	for	the	two	countries.	An	ability	to	find	a	middle	ground	may	help	
address	them	and	aid	in	reducing	the	imbalances	in	the	existing	trade	flows.	Further	research	on	
this	is	undoubtedly	required.
Last	but	not	least,	positive	political	signals	should	not	be	underestimated.	The	mutual	importance	
of	 two	 countries	 to	 each	 other	 is	 emphasized,	 among	 other	 things,	 by	 visits	 of	 high-ranking	
politicians.	 Since	 taking	 office	 in	 November	 2005,	 German	 Chancellor	 Angela	 Merkel	 visited	
China	six	times.	During	that	same	period,	she	visited	Brazil	just	once,	in	May	2008.
5.  Brazil and Germany as Leaders in EU-Mercosul Free Trade 
Relations 
As	evidenced	by	high-level	meetings	on	both	sides	of	the	Atlantic,	the	EU	and	Brazil	are	keen	on	
fast-tracking	the	free	trade	dialogue.	However,	progress	has	remained	elusive.	Certain	members	
of	Mercosul	remain	reluctant	to	liberalize	trade	at	a	moment	when	their	countries	face	significant	
macroeconomic	 turbulence.	 Meanwhile,	 the	 EU	 maintains	 agricultural	 subsidies	 that	 could	
prevent	Mercosul	countries	from	leveraging	their	comparative	advantages,	thus	disincentivizing	
cooperation.	
Yet	 a	 window	 of	 opportunity	 exists.	 Uruguay	 and	 Paraguay	 have	 joined	 Brazil	 in	 expressing	
interest	 in	 rapidly	 advancing	 the	dialogue.	Meanwhile,	 officials	 from	 the	European	Parliament	
have	insinuated	that	there	may	be	“more	room	for	maneuver”	regarding	EU	agricultural	subsidies	
this	time	around	(Leahy,	2013).	The	entire	process	could	benefit	from	strong	leadership,	both	in	
private	negotiations	and	in	the	sphere	of	public	debate.	As	the	largest	countries	from	either	side	
(both	 in	 terms	of	population	and	GDP),	Brazil	 and	Germany	are	particularly	well	positioned	 to	
assume	this	leadership	role.
While	 trade	 with	 Brazil	 is	 currently	 less	 important	 for	 Germany,	 it	 presents	 an	 important	
opportunity,	 as	 South	 America	 is	 a	 region	 still	 poorly	 integrated	 with	 Germany.	 The	 German	
government	should	therefore	be	a	strong	proponent	of	such	an	agreement	as	work	to	counteract	
more	protectionist	EU	governments.	
Internally,	Brazilian	trade	negotiators	can	work	closely	with	the	Mercosul	partners	who	are	more	
amicable	to	an	EU-Mercosul	agreement.	If	Brazil,	Uruguay	and	Paraguay	can	agree	on	reasonable	
terms	to	present	to	the	EU,	this	will	put	increased	pressure	on	other	Mercosul	members	to	join.	
If	Venezuela	and	Argentina	continue	 to	hold	out,	 they	 risk	pushing	Brazil	 towards	a	 two-track	
negotiation	process	that	could	redefine	Mercosul.	
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Externally,	Brazilian	public	and	private	leaders	could	mount	a	public	campaign	drawing	attention	
to	why	they	believe	an	EU-Mercosul	FTA	can	tangibly	benefit	the	Brazilian	economy.	While	some	
leaders	have	spoken	on	the	issue,	a	campaign	with	a	consistent	and	long	term	strategy	would	be	
more	effective	in	building	momentum	for	the	project.
Germany,	for	its	part,	must	push	the	EU	to	adopt	a	less	defensive	position	on	agricultural	imports	
in	 order	 to	 entice	 the	 South	American	 bloc	 to	 join	 in	 the	 agreement.	Germany	 should	 use	 its	
bargaining	power	within	the	EU	in	order	to	push	for	the	dismantling	of	outstanding	trade	barriers.
At	 the	 same	 time,	 these	 important	multilateral	 initiatives	 should	 not	 constrain	 the	 expansion	
of	bilateral	relations.	 In	services	sectors	as	well	as	 in	manufacturing,	 there	is	a	wide	scope	for	
partnerships	and	preferential	trade	facilitation	measures,	within	WTO	rules,	that	can	significantly	
boost	bilateral	 flows.	Coupled	with	a	wise	and	mutually	beneficial	 transfer	 of	 technology,	 they	
represent	a	pragmatic,	results-oriented	approach	that	can	be	started	immediately.	
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Moving Forward: Finding the Common Ground
All	of	these	recommendations	imply	that	there	is	common	ground	between	Brazil	and	Germany	
in	 terms	 of	 economic	 strategies,	 strengths	 and	 policies.	 By	 finding	 this	 common	 ground,	 the	
burgeoning	relationship	between	the	two	can	continue	to	grow.	
As	this	“common	ground	process”	advances,	coordinated	on	multiple	levels	(among	governments,	
institutions	 and	 investors),	 the	 conversation	 on	 trade,	 technology	 and	 other	 significant	 policy	
topics	might	become	 increasingly	more	 feasible,	and	 further	mutually	beneficial	arrangements	
may	be	discovered.
As	 such,	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 highly	 advanced	 German	 economy	 and	 the	 rapidly	
developing	and	dynamic	Brazilian	economy	can	truly	become	a	relationship	for	the	21st	century.	
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